

之勝利價值以較其三層火力？斯此戰爭之條件，
假使為海軍之防禦目的，為存續之國，則中國
國軍為制之無勝一凡平後，主權之存亡，則以中國
之存亡為主權之存亡，中國民依存勝得也。

(乙) 司令長官：國軍一標主：在實行十八個月的外
交手段，達此不擴國軍之權，行此為政府之期，則
中華人民之民族，有能為何？雖然，此實為外
國之實力，實力上能存於太平洋，於此甚，政府，復將以
上所言之層級上力，問題付之司令長官：國軍之勝得也
。若又若此，政府當進行之，實力不存，則中華人民之
勝得，將然，行也。

(丙) 政計：戰爭三種極的：若以之為目標，則之為對象，
樹立之三層火力。若以之為標，則戰爭半命參加，半命之高
外，行此標，則能之長，信，事，出，未，不，
決之之目標，計，通，樹，之，層，火，力，不，行，不，前，
為，之，標，三，種，極，的，參，加，為，應，行，隊，之，艦，洋，艦，隊，冰，道，
之，又，本，國，安，全，基，地，於，天，王，之，下，訓，練，用，船，船，
之，重，艦，船，之，用，之，三，層，火，力，之，下，方，有，三，層，火，力，不，存，
此，標，之，方，之，本，國，重，艦，船，動，員，之，出，本，之，十，三，分，
重，艦，船，戰，鬥，加，進，步，之，三，大，西，洋，十，一，大，洋，十，一，
艦，之，安，全，之，方，凡，。

江，一，本，一，年，一，二，/署，9/

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(28) 5 December 1941, Subject: Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941-March 31, 1942.
(Excerpt)

I.B. 159-A

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Supplementary Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation
December 1, 1941 - March 31, 1942.

The Tripartite Pact which Japan signed with Germany and Italy in September, 1940, by implication requires Japan to attack the United States, or any other power, except Russia, not involved in the European war at that time, should it attack either of the Axis partners. The strong Russian resistance to Nazi attack has, however, been a damper to Japanese enthusiasm for her Axis obligations. Although Foreign Minister Togo, who succeeded Toyoda, has announced that there is no change in the foreign policy of Japan, and that Japan will adhere to the Axis alliance, there is evidence that in order to secure a better position for herself, she might disregard her obligations, and even withdraw from the Axis. Japan has boundless ambitions in East Asia, but in view of the increasing American and British strength in the Far East, and the continued stalemate in China, she finds herself in a more and more unfavorable strategic position to realize these ambitions. Japanese government leaders are aware of the perils of further military adventures; they want to avoid a general war in the Pacific. They wish by every means possible to inveigle the United States into an agreement "looking toward a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between the two countries." This simply means recognition of Japan's territorial and economic gains in Eastern Asia. The result of these conflicting desires is a state of almost desperate indecision. The fact that Japanese newspapers have come out with their most bombastic bluster during the beginning of Mr. Kurusu's conference seeking a peaceful settlement with this country is the best indication of the lack of coordination, the indecision, and the confused general political situation in Japan. There can be no doubt that the army hotheads, the Black Dragon Society, and other intransigents will oppose most strenuously any major concessions by their present government leaders. Thus the chief obstacle to successful negotiations by Mr. Kurusu or any other envoy, has been the fact that although Premier Togo is an army man, he cannot be said to control the army, the navy, or the ultra-nationalistic secret societies. Until such control is assured, no agreements through negotiations can be successfully carried out. The Kurusu conference can now be said definitely to have ended in failure because of the extreme position taken by the Japanese Government in regard to concessions which they felt could be made in the Far Eastern Area.

Without their previous enthusiasm and behind uncertain leadership, the Japanese are continuing in the path to what they believe is their "divinely appointed destiny" without being too sure as to where that destiny will take them. As a matter of fact, there

is evidence that the people of Japan are becoming more and more alarmed and apprehensive; they fear that the present course is taking them into a major war with not just one power, but with a combination of powers. In her present situation, if Japan goes to war, her people will enter it desperately rather than confidently.

c. Economic. Because of the ever increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange, and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase sharply the deficiencies in these categories.

Germany's attack on Russia has cut off the supply of military and industrial equipment and machinery from Germany to Japan. The Japanese are finding that economically, as well as politically, the Tripartite Pact has serious disadvantages to them. The pro-Axis leaders are having more and more difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.

Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is anything but prosperous. Labor shortages, lack of adequate and sufficient transportation facilities, guerrilla warfare and, most of all, lack of cooperation on the part of the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force or the threat of force, have prevented Japan from realizing the economic benefits which she has so often and so loudly proclaimed would result from her scheme.

The firm united front of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies in enforcing the embargo has put Japan "on the spot" economically. Even little Thailand has been encouraged to resist Japanese pressure for economic, as well as political, concessions. The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assistance from the regions under her control in East Asia, and to continue her efforts to persuade the ABD powers through threats and promises to relax the embargo. If she goes to war to achieve her economic objectives, Japan faces ruin; but at the same time she feels that achievement of these objectives are vital to her existence.

Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries or a major war effort, even continued effort against China. The stoppage of trade and freezing of credits has drastically reduced Japan's supply of raw materials, and has caused her to begin using her reserves. Many of her industries are suffering from shortages, rationing has been extended and intensified; in short, economically Japan is in perilous plight. The situation calls for strenuous measures; yet, if she goes to war, she may use up her reserves, especially of oil and steel, before she can force a decision favorable to herself. Thus her economic situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders. This is a problem which she must solve within the next few months.

• • • • •

(Pages 1379, 1381, 1382, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



監視書類第千五百號 Nノ三

アメリカ合衆國第七十九議會第一會期 以降敵政事共同調査委員會監視書類
三十三號

監視書類第三十三號

ワシントン監視會 G-1 作成軍事情報評價

（二十八）千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月五日

主題。千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月一日ヨリ千九百四十二年（昭和十七年）三月三十日迄ノ情報ノ定期六喰監視追加（抜萃）

I · B · 第百五十九號ノ A

千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月五日

監視長充電書

主題。千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月一日ヨリ千九百四十二年（昭和十七年）三月三十日迄ノ情報ノ定期六喰監視追加



千九百四十年（昭和十五年）九月日本ガ猶豫兩國ト締結セル三國同盟ハ
 アメリカ東ハアメリカ以外ノ國ニシテ其時歐洲戰爭ニ参加シオラザル國ヘ
 但シソ聯テ哈イテガ極東ノ何レカヲ攻撃スル時ハ日本ガソノ國ヲ攻撃
 スベキコトヲ合意的ニ要求シテキル。併シドイツノ侵略有對スルソ順ノ形
 勢ナル抵抗ハ日本ノ對極東義務兼任熱ラ冷却セシメタ。豐田ノ後繼者タル
 新外務大臣東郷ハ日本ノ外交政策ニハ變化ガナク、極東同盟ヲ守ルモノヲ
 アルトヨリ明シタガ面モ日本ハヨリ有利ナ立場ヲ確保スルタメニ極東同盟ニ
 對スル參謀責任ヲ負シ更ニ進ムデ同盟カラ勝退モスルカモ知レナイ左
 ガアル。日本ハ東亞ニアツテ無観ノ野望ヲ抱イテキルガ、英米ノ朝東ニ於
 ケル兵力増加ト日本ノ立場ニ於ケル依然タル軍事狀態ノタメニソノ憂心ノ
 理ニハ爲々不利ナシ其位立ツテ來テキル。日本政府首腦部ハ今日
 以上事ニ眞事行動ヲ起スコトニ對シ極々危險ノ伴フコトニ氣ヅイテ太平洋
 日米兩國調ニシハル全未解決問題ノ和平的解決ヲ目標トスル「協約ニアメ
 リカテ首肯サセタイ希望デキル。コレハ單ニ東亞ニ於ケル日本ノ領土的及

ビ、深齊的利益體得ノ承認ヲ意味スルモノニ繋ギナイ

コレ等相撲達スル希望ノ結果ハドウカト云ヘバ殆ト如何アトモ出來ナイ不決ト云フ聯説ガソレナノデアル。來炳氏ガ吾ガアメリカトノ和平解決ヲ求メテ行ツタ事ノ覺初ニ於イテ日本ノ各新聞ガ置々タル論説ヲ以テ居ギ事キ立テク事實ハ日本國內ノ不統制、不決断、一派政局ノ混亂狀態等ノ消息ヲ収モヨク寺テシテキル。日本ノ實力ノ過激派、異龍會一派ソノ他非公協派ハ現在ノ日本政府首腦部ガ如何ナル重要論歩ヲ行ハフトシテモ經力反對スルコトニハ毫末ノ擧モナイ。首相東郷ハ陸軍出デアルガ彼ハ陸海軍乃至海軍ナシ家主義者ノ聯密結社ノ統率取締者デアルトイフコトハ出來ナイ。コノ事柄ハ來炳氏ソノ他如何ナル便計ニモセヨソレ等ノ人ノ行フ成功的交渉ニ對スル主ナル摩碍トナツテキル。コレ等終極目的ガ確實ニ行ハレルヤウニナラ又限リハ如何ナル達成モ交渉會合ニヨリテ貞潔メルコトハ出來ナイ。今日デハ來炳會談ハ失敗ニ終ツテ了ツタイ時シ偶ル所デアルガコレハ日本政府ガ東ニ於テナシ爆ルト感ジタニ歩點ニ付眞シテ深ツタ主張ノ結果デアツタコトニ親因スルノデアル

日本国民ハ以前ノヤウナ燕モナク不安ナ指掌ノ下ニ彼等ノ所謂「神ノ定メ
給フタ運命」ナリト信ズル目撃ニ向ヒ依然歩ミテ續ケテキルガ彼等ハソノ運
命ナルモノガ彼等ヲ導キ行ク先ノ如何ナル處ナルカハツキリ知ラヌノデアル
事實上、日本国民ノ警悟危惧ノ念ハ弱力ニ急々蓋シクナリツツアル、即チ彼
等日本国民ハ現下ノ行跡ハ雖ニ一箇國デナクシテ彼等國テ一國トスル敵トノ
大戰爭ニ自分達ヲ引キ入レツツアルコトヲ怖レテキル。若シ日本ガ開戰スル
トスレバ国民ハ自信ヲ以テセズシテ自暴自棄的ニ戰爭ニ加ハルコレガ現下ノ
日本ノ情勢デアル

○、經濟。米英荷印ノ對日貿易禁止ノ迄々強化シ行クガタメニ日本ノ經濟
事情ハ陰々ニ而モ確實ニ悪化シテキル。日本人ハモトカラ軍用機材、適當ナ
ル外國製品、充分ナル外國貿易ニ禁ケテキルガ今度ノ貿易禁止ハコノ方面ノ
不足ヲ急々甚ダシクスルコトニ役立ツタ
潤滑カラ日本ヘ向ケテノ運送及ビ産業設備機械ノ供給ハ猶遠ノソ聯攻撃ノ
タメニ途絶シタ。日本ハ三國經濟同盟ガ政治的ノミナラズ經濟的方面ニ於テ
モ又自分ニ重大ナル不利急ナ事等ヲ有シテキルコトニ氣ヅキツツアル

軍事派ノ首腦者ハ日獨同盟正當化ノ爲ニ爲々困難ヲ感ジツツアル

日本ノ大東亜共榮體ハ少シモ成功シテキナイ。勢力薄弱、遍初且ツ充分ナル
資源情ノ不足、グリラ威嚇殊ニ兵力テ以テ乃至兵力ノ威嚇ヲ用キテ「日」
内ニ引入レラレタル民衆ノ協力不足ハ日本ガ吾ガ計畫ニヨリテ斯々ノ經濟的
風氣ガ生ズベシト幾度力據テ大ニシテ言明シタソノ恩澤ノ實現ヲ今日迄防ゲ
來ツタノデアル米英聯印ガ對日貿易禁止施行ニ張ツタ強固ナル共同戰線ハ日
本ヲ經濟的ニ「壓ツタ」。小國泰デスラモコレニ力テ得テ政治的進歩ノミナ
ラズ經濟的進歩ニ對スル日本ノ壓迫ニ抵抗スルニ至ツタ。貿易禁止ノ結果ト
シテ日本ハ止ムチ得ズ東亜ニ於ケルソノ支那下地域カラ今日以上ノ支援ヲ得
ント努メ且ツ處置及ビ約束ヲ以テ米英聯ヲ聯致シ以テ貿易禁止ヲ緩和セシメ
ソノ經濟的目的達成ヲ目眞トシテ開誠スルトセバ日本ハ破滅ニ直面スルコト
ニナルノデアルガ又日本ハコノ經濟的目的ノ達成ハ自己存ニハ死活ニ關ス
ル理重大事デアルコトニ氣ヴィテキル

日本ハ白團ノ製造工事維持ニモ本格的戦争ノタメ努力、否長期對支那ヲ持

壁スルタメニモ重要資材ニ缺ケテキル。貿易往還ト支那産來航ノタメニ日本ヘノ原科供給ハ徹底的ニ減少シソノタメ日本ハ該輔資材ノ使用ヲ始メルニ至ツタ。ソノ工業ノ多クハ材料徹底ニ修ミ、當面給ハ強化サレタ、要スルニ日本ハ經濟的危機ニ直面シテキル。今日ノ情勢ヲハナル努力ヲ要スル資國的手段ヲ講ゼネバナラヌ羽目ニナツテキルガ其レニモ拘ラズ日本ガ競争ヲ開始スルトセバ日本ハ自己ニ有利ナ解決ヲ他ニ強要シ得ルニ既ニソノ強化資材、特ニ石油鋼鐵ノ輸入ヲ急ク便ヒ米スコトニナル可能性ガアル。斯クテ日本ノ首腦部ノ決心ヲ曉ラセルノモ主トシテ日本ノコソ經濟事情ニ依ルノデアル。コノ問題ハ此所數ヶ月間内ニ日本方解決セネバナラヌ問題デアル

「支那事變」第十四卷、千三百七十三、千三百八十一、千三百八十二頁

Proceedings of Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner - Thursday, December 20, 1945

• • • • •

(5172) Mr. MITCHELL. Well, can you identify for us WPL-46?
Admiral TURNER. WPL-46 was the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, derived from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, which in turn was derived from BC-1 and 2, the American-British conversations.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, is WPL-46 involved in any one of these 13 items on Exhibit 44, which lists various war plans?

Mr. KEFFE. Is it the same as Rainbow No. 5?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. KEFFE. That is what I would like to get cleared up.

Admiral TURNER. Yes. I said that WPL-46 is Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, shown in No. 11, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is another name for Rainbow No. 5, is it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. WPL-46 is a war-plans number.

• • • • •

(Page 1951, Part 4 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



眞珠湾攻撃調査共同委員會議事録一合衆國 第七十九議會 第一期

一九四五年十二月二十日、木曜日、リチモンド・ケリー・ターナー
機督ノ證言ヨリノ抜萃

・・・・・

ハ五一七二一ミツチエル氏、サテ、^{機方ハ}吾々ニ WPL-1四六トハ何ズ
アルカ開カニスルコトガ出来マスカ。

タリナ一提督、WPL-1四六ハ陸海軍同基礎作戦計畫、レインボウ第五
號、ニ由來スル海軍基礎作戦計畫、レイガボウ第五號、
デアリマシタガ、此ノ陸海軍興基礎作戦計畫、レイン
ボウ第五ハ又米英會談▲日〇一及ビニ端ヲ登シタモ
ノデス。

ミツチエル氏、サテ、スルト W P L - 四六ハ種々ノ戦争計畫ヲ目錄シタ
證據書類四四ノ是等十三項ノ何レカニ包含サレテキルノ
デスカ。

チーフ氏、ソレハレインボー第五ト同ジモノデスカ。

ミツチエル氏、私が知ラントシテキルノハソノコトデス
キーフ氏、ソレラ私ハ明ラカニシタイノデス。

ターナー提督、ソウデス、既ニ申上ゲタ通り W P L - 四六トハ第十一項
ニ示サレテキル海軍基礎作戦計畫、レインボー第五ノコ
トデアルト申シマシタ。

ミツチエル氏、ソレハレインボー第五ノ別等デスネ
ターナー提督、ソウデス。W P L - 四六ノ作戦計畫考覈キス
• • • • •

（「眞珠灣攻撃」—第四部 一九五一頁）



2

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
24 September 1940,

24 SEPTEMBER 1940.

DEAR JO: I am working on a letter for you but will send you a copy of my letter to Peck; it is self-explanatory.

I meant simply to mention Faulkner but got into something a little more serious.

Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too well. Spent over three hours in the State Department yesterday - something over two in the morning with Mr. Hull, Welles and Hornbeck, and then again in the afternoon over an hour with Mr. Welles. I believe had you been present you would have been in agreement with what I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I could. I may say that the same general picture so far as our attitude is concerned still holds, although I would not be surprised, confidentially between you and me, to see an embargo on scrap but this too would be along the lines State has been working on.

I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point, an embargo on fuel oil for reasons which are obvious to you and with which I may say I think the State Department is in concurrence. I believe Mr. Hull brought it up to get a thorough discussion of the subject and Mr. Welles said he was in complete agreement with me.

Hope to get a letter off in the next day or two with a coverage of some of the thoughts that I have been playing with and, as you know, my mind is completely open to you, almost to simply thinking out loud.

With every good wish as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico." Long Beach, California.

P.S. Just received yours with regard to your coming East and will take it up with the Secretary. Unless there is something you feel you want to talk about or that crops up after your arrival on the Coast, I will tell the Secretary I see no need of your coming East, at least for the moment.

I am sorry the message was not sent to the Fleet. I have felt that was an Aide's job. When with the Secretary I always sent them; in the last case when I visited Hawaii I sent them for the Secretary not only to the Navy and to the Army but to the Governor as well. I will tell Mort Deyo to be on guard against these slips hereafter.

Perhaps a letter from the Secretary now would be helpful. I will talk to him about it.

25 SEPTEMBER 1940.

P.S. to my letter of yesterday.

After my note to you of yesterday I spoke to Mort Deyo about telegrams back to the Fleet or other activities after the Secretary's visits.

Mort told me that the Secretary was preparing letters himself as a result of his visit out there so you may expect to hear from him.

D. D. 1500-0-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
24 September 1940.

My feeling is that a letter sometime after a visit can never take the place of an appreciative despatch and I have so told Mort. Of course in the last analysis the Secretary is the Boss but I have given Mort the thought - here's hopin'.

Until you wrote I had not seen the sheet which placed officer and enlisted personnel under the Assistant Secretary or at least that particular item escaped my attention. It was not in the original suggestions I made to the Secretary. I immediately took it up with the Secretary and it has been changed; personnel now coming directly under the Secretary which is the same as it has been. Of course you know that BuNav and OpNav usually settle these things pretty much themselves.

/s/ BETTY.



辯書

一五〇〇一〇一

一九四〇年九月二十四日附

海軍大將エイチ・アール・スタークより海軍大將ジエー・オー・リチャード
ソン宛の書翰

ジヨウ殿

私は貴方に手紙を書かうと嘗て申しあげましたが、併しペックに送つた私の
手紙の寫を送ることにします。それを見れば話は自然わかるでせう。

私は昨フオクナーの事を一寸言つて見よう考へましたがもう少し重大な
事柄に入つてしまひました。

卒直に言へば、私は今の事態を余り好みません、私は昨日國務省で三時間
余り過しました。

午前中にハル氏、ウエルズ氏、ボーンベック氏と二時間余り、又午後に一
時間余ウエルスと過したのです。若し貴方が出席して居られたなら、私の
した事に同意されたであらうと確信し私が思ふ所を出來得る限り強硬に主張



しました。私達の態度に關する限りでは未だ同様の一般的情況が續いてゐるといつても差支へないでせう。但しこれは私と貴方の間だけの話ですが私は屑鐵の輸出禁止が實行されても驚かないでせう。併しこれとて國務省が骨折つて來た紳に沿ふものであります。

燃料油禁について私は強硬に反対し、自分の主張を通したと思ひます、その理由は貴方にも能く分つてゐるし國務省もそれに同意してゐると云ひ得ると思ひます。ハル氏はこの問題について充分な討議をする爲にこの問題を持出しウエルズ氏は私に全く同意すると言ひました。

私が今まで色々考へてみたことの一端を申上げる爲「兩日中に手紙を出したいと思ひます、御存じの通り、私の心中は殆ど聲を出して考へると言ふ位に貴方には感蔵なきものであります

（署名）ペツティ

敬具

カリフオルニヤ州ロングビーチ
米國軍艦ニュー・メキシコにて

米國艦隊司令長官
米國軍大尉 シエー・オー・リチャードソン

追 伸

只今貴方の東部來訪の手紙を拜見、長官と話して見ませう。

貴方が何か相談したいと思ふ事或は貴方が當沿岸到着後に何か起らない限り私は長官に少くとも差當つて貴方の東部來訪の必要を認めないと言はうと思ひます

言附が艦隊に送られなかつた事を私は残念に思ひます。私はそれは副官の仕事のやうに思つてゐました、長官に同行した時は、私は常にそれを送りました。私が最近ハワイを訪問した時、私は長官に代つて海軍及び陸軍ばかりでなく知事にも送りました。これから後にこのやうな失敗を繰返へさぬよう注意するようモート・デイヨーに言ひ付けませう。今からでも長官からの手紙は役立つてせう。私はそれについて彼に相談します。

追 伸

昨日の手紙のつゝき 一九四〇年九月二十五日

昨日貴方宛の手紙を書いた後に長官來訪後艦隊にて電報を打つとか又その他の

行動についてモートダイヨーに話しました。

モートは、長官は來訪の結果として自分で手紙を書いてゐるといふことを話したので、貴方は長官から手紙が來ると思つてゐてよいでせう。

訪問後しばらくして來た手紙といふものは決して感謝の手紙の役割は果たないといふ風に思つてゐます。そしてこの事をモートに話しました。勿論結局は長官が親分ですが自分の考へをモートに話しました、旨く行けば好いかと思つてゐます。

貴方が手紙をよこすまでは私は将校及兵員を次官の支配下に置くといふ通告をみたことはありません、少くともその特別の項目に気が付かなかつたのです、それは私が長官に提出した原案にはありませんでした。私はすぐこの事について長官と論じそれは變更されました。人員は今はこれまでと同様長官の支配下であります、勿論貴方も御存じの通り海軍一人事一局と海軍作戦部は普通はこれらの問題を彼等自身で大体處理してゐます。

一等名一ベツテイ

Excerpt from the testimony of General George C. Marshall given before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, - Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session, December 13, 1945.

• • • •

Senator FERGUSON. General, you mentioned the other day in relation to some material being furnished to Borneo, Port Moresby, and some others. Did we build airports there prior to December 7?

General MARSHALL. We endeavored to have the existing strips sufficiently improved to make them, make it possible to land and take off with a B-17.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that upon your order, or where did that order come from?

General MARSHALL. That was upon my order to General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you conferred with anyone in relation to that prior thereto?

(4025) General MARSHALL. I certainly must have because while that was my desire, to have it done, I would have felt, I am quite certain that I should get the o.k. of the higher government officials because I was involving contacts with other governments.

Senator FERGUSON. And who would those higher government officials be?

General MARSHALL. Oh, it would be the Secretary of State - first the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the President. Whether one or all, I don't know. I should imagine the most normal thing would have been the Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. And prior to sending any material, that is, I am talking about bombs and ammunition -

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would confer with the Secretary of State or the President, or Secretary of War?

General MARSHALL. My assumption would certainly be that I would not have given those instructions to General MacArthur unless I had gotten a clearance at least from the Secretary of War, but more probably from the Secretary of State, and I may have gotten a direction from the President, I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you recall of any report (4026) submitted to the War Department which came to your attention in December of 1940, and revised in April of 1941?

To refresh your memory, I hand you some papers. You needn't read them aloud. I just want you to go through them enough to be able to say whether or not you ever saw such a report.

It involves the oil in the Netherlands Islands.

(4027) Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Is that an exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Senator LUCAS. What report is it in?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking the General about it. Do you want to see it, Senator, first?

Senator LUCAS. No. I was just interested in knowing whether it was an exhibit. Who makes the report?

Senator FERGUSON. The report is not signed.

General MARSHALL. Also has no heading on the paper where it came from.

Senator LUCAS. It seems to me a little unusual to refresh someone's recollection upon an anonymous report.

Senator FERGUSON. If the Senator will look at it, it purports to be a copy of a report filed with restricted offices, and the Army is one of the offices.

General MARSHALL. What was the question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. After looking that over, had that ever been called to your attention?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall specifically that it had. I know that we were very much interested in what the Japanese, what the resources were for Japan in that region, and to what degree they would be destroyed.

(4028) Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that one of the things, at least, that we considered Japan wanted to go into the Netherlands Islands for, was to get oil for war purposes, there had been questions up before you and the various officials about oil, whether an embargo on oil would defeat them?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there anything brought to your attention that there was one way to keep them from moving into these islands to get oil and that was to prepare so that those oil wells should be destroyed either prior to them going down or at the time they were coming, full preparation being made, and they being advised on that point, did you ever hear of that before?

General MARSHALL. Will you please read the first part of the question?

(First part of the question read.)

General MARSHALL. That is sufficient.

It was brought to my attention a number of times the factor of oil as it affected the Japanese in their capacity to make war, as it might affect the Japanese by our strictures on the supply of oil for the United States, and as it would affect the Japanese in making war if they had available Borneo and other Indonesian fields, and as it would affect them if we were able to destroy those fields so that the oil would (4029) not be usable for a considerable period of time. All those facts were discussed, were brought to my attention, and I think I asked a number of questions regarding them.

• • • • •

合衆國第七十九議會第二會期、眞珠灣攻撃共同調查委員會（一九四五年）に於て行はれたるジョージ・シー・マーシャル元帥の證言よりの抜萃。

ファーガソン上院議員。元帥、貴方はボルネオ、ボート・モレスビー、其の他に供給された或る物資に關して、先日述べられました。十二月七日以前に我が軍は同地方に空港を建設しましたか。

マーシャル元帥。現存滑走路を充分改善して空港とし、^{B-17}を着陸離陸せしめ得るやうに努力しました。

ファーガソン上院議員。それは貴方の命令に基いたのですが、或はその命令は何所か外から來たのですか。

マーシャル元帥。それはマツカレス元帥に對する私の命令に依つたのです。

ファーガソン上院議員。それには先だつて、それに關して誰かと相談した事がありましたか。

(四〇二五) マーシャル元帥。確かに相談した事があつたに違ひありません。それをさせる事を私は希望はしてゐましたが、さうするには他の官廳と連絡する必要が生じますから、政府上層官吏の承諾を得なければならぬと感じてゐた筈だと思ひます。

ファーガソン上院議員。それではそれらの政府上層官吏は誰でせうか。マーシャル元帥。それは國務長官でせう。——第一に陸軍長官、國務長官それから大統領でせう。そのうちの一人であつたか全部であつたかは分りません。最も順當なのは國務長官であつただらうと思ひます。

ファーガソン上院議員。そして物資を送るに先立ち、といふのは、爆弾及び弾薬に就て云つてゐるのですが――
マーシャル元帥。はい、さうです。

ファーガソン上院議員。貴方は國務長官、大統領或は陸軍長官と相談するでせう?

マーシャル元帥。私の臆測では勿論、少くとも陸軍長官から更には又恐らく國務長官から認可を得なければマツカーサー元帥にそれらの指令を與へなかつたでせう。それから私は大統領から指令を受けたかも知れな

いが思ひ出せません。

ファーガソン上院議員。元帥、一九四〇年十二月に貴方の目に觸れ、そして、一九四一年四月に修正された陸軍省へ提出の報告（四〇二六）があつたのを記憶してゐますか。

貴方の記憶を絆たにする爲に、或る書類を、貴方に渡しませう。それを、音読されなくともよろしい。唯貴方がさう云ふ報告を、曾て見た事があるか否かを質問し得る程度に目を通して欲しいのです。

それは蘭印諸島の石油に關するものです。

（四〇二七）

ルーカス上院議員 貴方は私に質問させて呉れますか

ファーガソン 同

はべ

ルーカス 同

それは證據書類ですか

ファーガソン 同

いえ

ルーカス 同

それは何の報告中にあるのですか

ファーガソン 上院議員。それを元帥に尋ねてゐるのです。貴方は元帥

より先に、それを御覧になりたいのですか。

ルーカス上院議員。いゝえ、私はそれが證據書であるかどうか知りたかつただけです。誰がその報告を作つたのですか。

ファーガソン上院議員。その報告書には署名がありません。

マーシャル元帥。且つこの用紙にはそれが何所から來たかを示す頃書がありません。

ルーカス議員。無名の報告書に就て、誰かの記憶を新たにさせるといふ事は些か異常な事と私には思はれます。

ファーガソン上院議員。若し貴方が、それを御覧になれば、それが成る限定された官廳に提出された報告書の寫しだといふことが分ります。そして陸軍はさう云ふ官廳の一つであります。

マーシャル元帥。上院議員、どう云ふ御質問でしたか。

ファーガリン上院議員 それに目を通されたら伺ひます。それは
曾て貴方の目に觸れた事がありましたか。

マーシャル元帥 それを見たといふ事を特に思ひ起しません。日
本軍が。。。その地域に日本軍に取つてどんな資源があるか又さ
の程度にそれらが破壊されるであらうかと云ふ事に我々が非常に興
味を持つてゐた事は記憶して居ります

(四〇二八)

フアーラソン上院議員 思ふに日本が開拓に侵入せんと欲した理由の少くとも一つは戦争目的の爲石油を得る事であり又石油に就て本邦の榮枯が日本軍を敗北させるかどうかといふことが貴方及び幾人かの官吏の間に問題となつたと了解してもよいでですか。

マーシャル元帥 はい。

フアーラソン上院議員 では石油を得る爲にこれらの諸島へ彼等が侵入するのを防ぐ道は一つありそれは完全な準備を整へ彼等が到着するに先立ち成は彼等がやつて来る時にそれらの油田を破壊する事でありその點を彼等に知らせるといふ事に就て何か氣が附いた事がありましたか。以前に此の事に就て聞いた事がありましたか。

マーシャル元帥 質問の最初の部分を讀んで下さいませんか。

(質問の最初の部分が讀まれる)

マーシャル元帥 それで充分です。石油の問題は何度も私の注意に上つた事がありました。石油は日本軍の戦争能力に影響を與へ合衆國に對するの石油供給に関する我々の非難に依つて日本人に影響を及ぼし若し彼等がボルネオその他のインドネシアの油田を利用出来れば彼等の戦争遂行に影響を及ぼすであらうし又相當長期に亘り石油を使用出来ぬ様に(四〇二九)それらの油田を破壊する事が我々に出来ればそれは彼等に影響したでせうから。され等の事實がすべて論議され私の注意する所となりました。又それについて私も多くの質問をしたと思ひます。

「眞珠灣攻撃」第三章、一五九一一五二一頁

D. D. 1500-P-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
1 October 1940.

1 October 1940.

DEAR J.O.: I hated to send you the despatch last night that the house would be full when you got here. Kit had not intended to return until two weeks from next Sunday when Harold Gillespie from Honolulu expected to be with us. However he has been again delayed, will not be here when planned, and as the only reason for Kit remaining at the Lake was for his coming, and his coming now being indefinite, they decided to come down this week. By they I mean Kit and Kewpie (our daughter) and her two children and nurse girl which will fill the house to about 100 percent complement.

The Secretary wants very much to see you. I told him of your letter. However, one of the things he wanted to talk to you about is the possibility of sending a detachment to the Far East; it is being urged here by some. I have opposed it and so has Ingersoll. Your thoughts are likely to be determinative.

The question of where to hold the Fleet Problem will be on the agenda.

In addition the Secretary says he would just like to talk to you anyway; so there you are.

I more or less took the bull by the horns with regard to getting more men aboard ship quickly and while we had written you about it the Secretary took it up with the President before we had time to get your reply, that is, with regard to cutting the training period to three weeks. I felt I was on fairly sound ground in bringing this up as my feeling is that it is in accord with your wishes. I would prefer to get twice the number of men in a given period and get them quickly rather than have them spend an additional five weeks or so at the Training Station.

Frankly I do not like the trend of things and I would not be surprised at anything happening any day. Your statement that we can not stay half in this war and half out sizes up the thing pretty well and I have long felt that it is only a matter of time until we get in.

I am writing the District Commanders a letter pointing out the gravity of the situation as I see it and will send you a copy. In this letter I made no attempt to go into much detail - my objective being that they get the spirit of the situation as I see it which would leave no stone unturned towards our immediate readiness. God knows I hope I am wrong because I realize what a little additional time would mean to us but sometimes things get out of hand either from the other fellow's action or our own.

Personally, I am looking forward as always to seeing you. I will keep the decks clear and will arrange our evenings according to your desires. The feminine part of my family are good soldiers on retiring upstairs and turning over the downstairs to stag get-togethers

• "D. D. 1500-P-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
1 October 1940.

which I find are so beneficial these days.

For next Tuesday, 8 October, I am tentatively
slating the following for dinner: The Secretary, Comdr.
Murphy, Admirals Sexton, Robinson, Nimitz, Ingersoll,
Towers, Furlong, Morell and General Holcomb.

I am sorry that you will not be putting up
with us as our quiet, late evening talks helped me so
much when you were last here.

With every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," San Pedro, California.

P.S. I see no reason in the world for any secrecy with
regard to your coming to Washington.

辯護側書證第一五〇〇號 1-P-1

昭和十五年十月一日附、ジェー・オー・リチャードスン海軍大將宛
エイチ・アール・スターク海軍大將書翰

昭和十五年十月一日

Doc. No. 1500-P-1

拜啓、貴下が當地にお越し下さるとしたら家が一ぱいになるので昨晩お手紙を差上けるのは氣が向きませんでした。荆妻キットは、次の日曜日から二週間、ハロルド・ギレスピーがホノル、から拙宅に来るまでは歸つて来ない筈でした。然しギレスピーは又々遅れて豫定の通りには當地に参りません。ギレスピーの來着がキットのレーク滯在の唯一の理由でした。ギレスピーの到着がはつきりしませんので、皆は今週歸つて来ることに決めました。皆とは、キットとキウビー（農女）と其の二人の子供達と子守娘のことですが、拙宅の定員一ぱい百パーセントに脹はすことでせう。

長官は非常に貴下との面会を希望して居ります。小生は貴翰の趣を長官



に話しました。然し長官が貴下と話したく思つて居る事の一つは、極東に分遣艦隊を派遣することの可能性についてです。それは當地に於て或る人々により提唱せられて居ることなのです。小生は反対致しました。インガーソールも反対しました。貴見亦恐らく決定的のこと、存じます。何處で艦隊問題討議の會を開くかといふ問題は議事日項に載る筈です。其の上長官は鬼も角貴下とお話したいと申して居ります。そこで貴下が會議にお越しになるといふ次第である。

小生も、もつと澤山の兵を早く軍艦に載せるといふ點に就ては聊か敢然として雑局に當つたといふ次第で、當方が此の問題に就て貴下にお手紙を差上げて居る間に、そして貴答即ち訓練期間を三週間に短縮すべしといふ貴信に接せざるうちに、長官は此の問題を大統領に持出したのです。小生はこれは貴需に副ふものであると信じ本問題を提起するに就ては充分確乎たる根據あるものと信じて居りました。小生は一定期間内に二倍の兵を得ること、これを更に五週間前後訓練所で過させるよりも寧ろ直ちに得ることの方が優ると思ひます。

卒直に云へば、小生は今日の事態を好みませんし、又何時如何なる事が

起らうとも驚きません。「我の外に置くことは出来るもの言葉で、小生も疾くより我々が戦争に入る時は時の問題であると考へて居たところです。

Def.Doc.#1500-P-1
小生は、地区司令官等（鎮守府要港司令長官等）に小生の眼に映する時局の重大性を指摘して書信を書いて居りますから、其の寫を送ります。此の書信の中でも小生は餘り微細な點には触れやうとしませんでした。小生の目的は、司令官達が、小生の見る時局の精神、我々の敏速なる備への爲めにはあらゆる手段を盡すといふ精神、を把握するといふことにあります。小生は自分の豫想が當つてくれなければよいとひそかに思つて居ます。何故かと云へば、小生は、もう少し時が與へられるといふことが我々にとつて何を意味するか、が時には物事は相手への行動からも自分の行動からも制御出来なくなつて行くものだといふことを知つて居ますから。

個人としても小生はいつもやうに貴下と會へる日を待望して居ります。準備を整へ、貴下のお望み通りに幾夜か語り合ふ様手筈をしませう。拙

宅の婦人連は二階へ上つて憩み階下をこの頃大に有益な女禁制の會合にあてる様するでせう。

次の火曜日、十月八日、次の人々を晩餐に招待しやうと思つて居ります。長官、マーヒー提督、セツクストン、ロビンソン、ニミツツ、インガーソール、タワーズ、ファーロング、モリール各海軍大將、ホルコム陸軍大將。

貴下が此の前指宅へお越しになつて、静かに語りあかしたことが大に有益であつた様に、今度お越し願へぬのは殘念です。ではどうぞ御機嫌よう。

敬
具

ベッティー（署名）

カリフォルニヤ洲サンベドロ港

合衆國軍艦 ニュー・メキシコ號

合衆國艦隊司令長官

海軍大將ジエー・オー・リチャードソン閣下

追伸、貴下が華盛頓にお越しになるのを秘密にする理由は毫も無いと思ひます。

Defense Doc. 1500-P-3

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(19) 16 October 1941 to OPNAV, Action: All Merchant Ships.

(19) Top Secret.

16 OCTOBER 1941.

From: OPNAV.

Action: All merchant ships.

Info:

162300

(Paraphrase)

The following despatch is for all United States merchant ships in the Pacific:

There is a possibility of hostile action by Japan against U.S. shipping. United States merchant ships at sea in the Pacific proceed now as follows: In Chinese waters, China Sea or Dutch Indies waters, proceed immediately to Manila, Singapore, or a North Australian Port. In North Pacific westbound, except those bound to Vladivostok, proceed to Honolulu unless close to the Philippines, in the latter case proceed there. Ships bound for Vladivostok, proceed on voyage. If Honolulu bound continue voyage. If in North Pacific eastbound, continue voyage. If in South Pacific, continue voyage. Vessels operating coastwise off of South America or between the United States and the west coast of South America, continue voyage. All coastwise shipping eastern Pacific, continue voyage. Usual trade routes should be avoided.

(Page 1402, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



アメリカ合衆國第七十九議會 第一期

眞珠灣攻撃調査合同委員會 書證第三十七號 ヨリノ抜萃

書證第三十七號

基礎的書證トシテノ傳達書

(19) 一九四一年十月十六日 「CANADA」へ、(譯者註「ヨリ」

ノ誤リカ?一

宛ハ全商船

(19) 極 秘

OPEN

一九四一年十月十六日

宛 知

一六二三〇〇

(解 読)

太平洋内ニアル合衆國全商船ニ對シ以下ノ急告ヲナス



合衆國船舶ニ對シ日本ガ敵對行爲ヲナス可能性アリ。太平洋内航行中ノ合衆國商船ハ左ノ如ク行動スペシ。中國近海、支那海又ハ蘭領印度近海内ニアルモノハ直チニ「マニラ」「シンガポール」又ハ北濠州ノ何レカノ港灣へ、北太平洋ヲ西航スルモノハ「ウラジオストック」向ノモノヲ除キ總テホノルルニ向フコト。但シ比島諸近ニアルモノハ比島ニ航行スペク、「ウラジオストック」向ノ船バソノママ航行繼續。「ホノルル」向ノ場合モ航行繼續。北太平洋ヲ東航ノ場合ハ航行繼續。南太平洋ニアル船舶ハ航行繼續、南米沿岸ヲ航行、或ハ合衆國ト南米西岸ノ間ヲ航行中ノモノハ繼續東部太平洋沿岸航行中ノモノハ總テ航行繼續通常ノ貿易路ハ避ケルベシ。

(「眞珠灣攻撃」—第十四卷 一四〇二頁)

Excerpt from the testimony of General George C. Marshall given before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States - Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session, December 10, 1945.

.....

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you have given, at the end of your memorandum - it is on page 5 of Exhibit 16 - you specifically make certain recommendations there.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "That the dispatch of United States Armed Forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that does not concern the voluntary air corps.

General MARSHALL. No, sir, because that was under China's pay, and control.

Senator FERGUSON. That was under the Chinese and not our movement, as you interpreted the other day.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces.

That was your recommendation, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether we were furnishing (329) and supplies to Borneo or any of the other islands? Did not your first report indicate that we were?

General MARSHALL. In that report I gave a specific example of furnishing ammunition to the Chinese Government which had been reserved for Iceland. I think it involved 7,000 rounds, and we gave them 40,000 of those, or maybe it was 3,000, one or the other. That was to be sent by General MacArthur from Manila, and we would replace them by shipment at the same time from San Francisco.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that under Lend-Lease?

General MARSHALL. I assume it was, sir. I was getting it out, and the details were being taken care of by someone else.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know what it was under?

General MARSHALL. I think it was under Lend-Lease, but my action was to get them started.

Senator FERGUSON. Your report of 1941, your first report indicates bombs were also furnished.

General MARSHALL. I do not believe that is quite what it was, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain it?

General MARSHALL. It was necessary, we felt, to have the ability to land, and gas, and arm the B-17's to the south of the Philippines for two reasons: One was in case (3292) we had to fly them in from Hawaii by that front, and the other one was that when you are operating strategical bombing planes of that type, their capacity is greatly increased for carrying bombs, and in range if they have a place they can shuttle to, and shuttle back from.

Therefore, we directed General MacArthur to take up with the governments concerned the proposition of preparing strips that would accommodate the B-17's and that he, General MacArthur, stock those strips with gasoline and bombs.

Senator FERGUSON. That was just anticipating, wasn't it, that if we got into any war we would be using these other bases, and we would be using the ABCD plan, the Singapore plan?

General MARSHALL. To that extent, yes, sir. The same thing is really covered in the ABC-1 and 2 plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. The point here was that the B-17's would be greatly restricted in what they did from the Philippines if they had no landing points other than in the Philippine Islands, and therefore it was essential, in my opinion - and I think I personally directed

this myself - that is my recollection - that these arrangements be made at Rabaul, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Balikpapan (3293) Borneo and Singapore.

SENATOR FERGUSON. Do you know when that material was furnished to those places?

General MARSHALL. The records show, and I know this, the deliveries were made and efforts to develop the strips were under way at Rabaul, at Port Moresby and Port Darwin before the outbreak of the war. My recollection is, and the records will undoubtedly show that the ship with the gasoline and bombs for Balikpapan, for Borneo and for Singapore, was just about to sail at the outbreak of the war.



(Pages 1250 - 1251, Part 3 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

我々ノ行動下ニハアリマセンデシタ。

「中國ニ對スル物質的援助ハロシヤ、英國及ビ米國軍隊ノ必要ニ應ジテ保進スペシ」トイフノガアナタノ進言ダツタノデバアリマセンカ。

マーシャル

ファガスン

ハイ、ソウデス。

アナタハ「ボルネオ」又ハソノ他ノ島ニ米國ガ「三二九一」及ビ軍需品ヲ供給シテ居タカドウカ御存知デスカ。アナタノ最初ノ報告ニハ供給シテ居タトナツテ居マセンカ。

マーシャル

アノ報告ノ中ニ私ハ、アイスランドノタメニ認定シテアウタ弾薬ヲ中國政府ニ供給シク特殊ノ一例ラ擧グマシタ多分全部デ七、〇〇〇發デアリ、ソノ中ノ四、〇〇〇發或ハ三、〇〇〇發ヲ與ヘタノデス。

ソノ何レカデアツタト思ヒマス。ソレハマツカーサー大將ガマニラカラ送ル筈ニナツテ居リ、同時ニサンフラン

シスコカラソノ代リヲ輸送スルコトニナツテ居マシタ。
ソレハ武器貸與法ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。
サウザンクタ思ヒマス。私ガソレヲ出サウトシテ居タ
マーシャル
ファガサン

ノデ詳細ノ點ニツイテハ誰カ他ノ人ガ處理シテ居マシタ
デハアナタハ、ソレガ何ニ基イテ行ハレタカ知ラナイノ
デスカ。

「一シヤル
武器賃與法ニ依ツタモノダト思ヒマス。シカシ私ノシタ
事、ソノ弾薬ヲ發送スルコトニアツタノデス。」

アガサン
一九四一年ノアナタノ報告、即チアナタノ最初ノ報告ニ
ハ爆弾モ亦爆弾モサンタ事ヲ示シテ居マス。

マーシヤル
私ハソウデハナイト思ヒマス。

ソノ點ヲ説明シテ下サイマゼンカ
私達ハ二ツノ理由カラフイリツピ
ンノ南部迄ヲ着陸ナ
B-17

セガソリンヲ補給シ武裝スル能力ヲモツコトガ必要デアルト思ヒマシタ。ソノ理由ノ一ツハ「三二九二」ノ場合

フアガスン

ヤーシヤル

フアガスン

ニ B-27 ラハワイカラ 該前線ヲ經テ飛行サセテ來ナケレバナ
ラヌコト、モウーヴノ理由ハ右型式ノ戰略的爆撃機ヲ選
用スル場合ニソレガ往復シ得ル地點ヲ有スレバ爆弾積載
能力及ビ行動範囲が非常ニ増大スルトイコトニアリマ
ス。ソレ故私達ハマツカ一サ一大陸ニ指令シテ B-27 収容
シ得ル地帶ヲ設備スル件ヲ關係當局ト交渉シテ處理シ、
同大陸ガソレ等ノ地帶ニガソリント爆弾ヲ貯藏スルヨウ
命令サマシタ。

ソレハ即チ、米國ガ戰爭ニ加ハル場合コレ等ノ基地ヲ使
用スルデアラウシ、又ヘビリ 計畫即チシンガボール計
畫ヲ實施スルデアラウト認悉シタニナルノデハアリ
マセシカ。

ソノ程度ニオイテヘサウデアリマス。同ジコトガ A B C
ト一及ビ二ノ計畫ニ於テセ念マレマス。

サウデス。

マーシャル

B-17

要點ハガフイリツ・ピン諸島以外ニ着陸地點ヲ持タナイ
 トスレバ彼等ガフイリツ・ピンカラ實施スル行動ハ大キナ
 制限ラ受ケタデアテウトイフコトデス。ソノ故私ノ考ヘ
 デハ右ノ機ナ設備ヲスルコトガラバウル、ボート・モレ
 ス・ビイ、ボート・ダ・ウイン、バリツクバパン、ボルネ
 オ及ゼシンガボールニモ必要デアルト思ヒ、又私ノ記憶
 ニヨレバソレヲ自ラ命ジタト思ヒマス。

ファガス

力。

ソノ材料ガ何時コレ等ノ場所ニ供給サレタカ御存知デス

マーシャル

私モ知ツテ居リマスガ、記録ニヨレバ、ラバウル、ボー
 ツ、モレスビイ及ビボート・ダ・ウインデハ戦争開始前
 ニ材料ガ引渡サレ各地帶ヲ設備スル努力ガ進行中デアリ
 マンタ。私ノ記憶スルトコロデハ、又記録ニモ確ニサウ
 音イテアルト思ヒマスガ、丁度戦争勃發當時ニハバリツ
 クバパン、ボルネオ及ゼシンガボール向ケノガソリント
 爆弾ヲ積ンダ船ガ出帆スルトコロデアツタノデス。

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 October 1940.

CinC File No.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

A16/01705

SECRET

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

From: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington, and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.

3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions:

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan.

Third. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was accelerated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliance between Germany, PURL: http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/da6651/

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5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active hostilities. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WPUSF 44 and WPUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation is believed beyond the present strength of the U. S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U. S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

(a) The present strength of the U. S. Fleet is not sufficient to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands are in strength superior to that of ORANGE and ready for further advance to the Western Pacific in condition to operate offensively in that area.

While recognizing the qualifying phrase "at the earliest practicable date," it is firmly believed that we cannot, at this time, even with Great Britain assuming responsibility for our Atlantic interests, denote that ocean of sufficient forces to protect our coastal trade and to safeguard our more vital interests in South America. Nor can we neglect the protection of our own and the interdiction of Japanese trade in the Southeastern Pacific. With these commitments adequately cared for, our remaining force is barely superior to ORANGE at the beginning of our westward campaign. It will undoubtedly be subject to attrition losses en route.

(b) The Army is not now prepared and will not, in the immediate future, be prepared to support our western advance. The Fleet Marine Force is not sufficient to support the necessary operations alone.

(c) The capture of BASE ONE is a major military operation requiring detailed knowledge of the area, detailed planning based on such knowledge, and the taking over, conversion, manning, training and organization of a large number of merchant ships. The establishment of the BASE, after its occupation, requires: (a), the transport of large quantities of material; (b), the organization, transport and maintenance of construction units capable of accomplishing the

D. D. 1500-Q-1

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CinC File No.

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A16/01705

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

necessary development; and (c), the defense and supply of the base during the construction period. The Plan requires the completion of this Base forty-five days after the arrival of the first material at the site.

We do not, at present, have the detailed knowledge of the area requisite for proper planning of these manifold activities. It is true that some knowledge, possibly sufficient for initiation of operations and general planning for the attack, may be obtained by reconnaissance after hostilities have commenced, and the Plan provides for such operations. However, it is not now known, nor can it be determined, until after actual occupation, whether or not the hydrography of the area permits the establishment of a fleet anchorage, what construction is possible on the land areas under consideration and whether or not adequate defensive installations, particularly air fields for land-based aircraft, can be established. Granting that the base seized offers possibilities for the establishment of these facilities, it appears certain that the assembly of material and the organization for construction must await the actual occupation. To the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, no material has as yet been assembled for this purpose, nor have any but the vaguest ideas for the ultimate accomplishment of this objective been advanced.

Present Fleet plans, due chiefly to lack of sufficient knowledge as a basis, and partly to the preoccupation of staffs of forces afloat with routine matters of administration and training, have been most general in nature and have extended chiefly to the assignment of tasks and forces. Only tentative ideas, (based largely on unsupported assumptions) for the actual accomplishment of the objectives, have been advanced.

D. D. 1500-Q-1

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(d) The time element, in the present Plan, is believed greatly out of proportion to the tasks to be accomplished. While a definite time limit does not actually appear (except for the forty-five day limit mentioned above), it is strongly implied in the tables in Appendix II of WPB 14 and throughout the O-1 Plan itself, that the operations visualized up to the establishment of BASE ONE can be accomplished in a period of some sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

It is the firm belief of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six months to one year would be required for its accomplishment. With the knowledge now available, the time required for subsequent operations can not even be guessed at. It is believed to be of the order of years rather than months.

(e) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan had its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticalities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan.

7. In addition to the ORANGE Plan, the Commander-in-Chief has available to him an approved Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. I, and a tentative draft, not as yet approved, of a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. II. The assumptions of neither of these Plans are applicable to the present situation, nor, to the knowledge

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of the current international situation.

of the Commander-in-Chief, is the assistance from allies visualized in the tentative draft of Rainbow No. II a likely possibility.

8. The foregoing considerations are set forth in some length in order to focus attention upon the fact that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself, in what he is led to believe may suddenly become a critical situation, without an applicable directive. He cannot, in the absence of a clear picture of national policy, national commitments and national objectives, formulate his own plans other than for obvious measures of security and defense and for accelerated preparation for further eventualities. He is of the firm belief that successful operations in war can rest only on sound plans, careful specific preparation and vigorous prosecution based upon confidence in the success of the course being pursued.

9. There is no intention or desire on the part of the Commander-in-Chief to evade his legitimate responsibilities nor is it desired that anything in this letter be so construed. It is fully realized that no plan can foresee or provide for every possible situation, and that adjustments and re-estimates must be made to fit the actual situation presented. At the same time, it is most strongly believed that the Commander-in-Chief must be better informed than he is now as to the Department's plans and intentions if he is to perform his full duty.

10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

- (a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;
- (b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);
- (c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;
- (d) In the light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody:
 - (1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;

D. D. 1500-Q-1

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A16/01705

U. S. Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
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of the current international situation.

- (2) Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;
- (3) Threats and raids against the enemy;
- (4) Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establishment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up to support them.

11. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch.

12. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

13. The exigency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

J. O. RICHARDSON



原文一頁

一九四〇年十二月二日「ジョン・ホー、リチャードソン」
リ「エイチ、アール、スターク」^{John H. Richardson} 指督ヘ宛タル書翰

同會議官文書號第

號

モ一六、ル、一七〇五

啟

華國合衆艦隊

旗艦、米國軍艦「ニューメキシコ」^{U.S.S. New Mexico}

一九四〇年十月二十二日

ワシントン州
ブレマートン^{Washington, Bremerton}米國海軍工廠

發信者
合衆艦隊司令長官

宛
先
海軍作戰部長

題
目
戦爭計畫一現下ノ國際情勢ニ鑑ミテソノ現況ト準備

一米國合衆國艦隊司令長官ガ最近「ワシントン」^{Washington} テ開カレタ會
議ヨリ歸任以來、同會議ニ於ケル論議ニ鑑ミ米國艦隊ノ作戰ニ對スル



現況ト準備ニ對シテ更ニ構想シ保リ且ツ研究ヲ行ツタ。コノ研究ノ結果、米國艦隊司令長官ハ、現在ノ情勢、取分ケ大洋ニ於ケル現状ノ認識ニ就キ上級當路者ノ腦裡ニ何等ノ疑懼ナカラシムルタメニ海軍作戰部長ニ御慮考ノタメ、若干ノ事實ト結論ヲ申上ゲ御考慮ヲ煩ハスコトヲソノ職務ナル義務ト考ヘルモノデアル。

二、現況ノ諸相ヲ尙ホ一層明瞭ニ説明スルタメニハ、之ニ影響ヲ與ヘテ居ル若テノ要因ニ考鏡ヲ加ヘ、且ツ是等要因ヲ現在ノ出來事ニ照シテ論ズルコトガ必要デアル。

三、七月、最初ニ「ワシントン」^{ワシントン}ニ赴イタ際海軍作戰部長宛ノ私言ニ於テ、司令長官ハ海軍トシテモ國家トシテモ日本國トノ戰爭ニ何等備ヘテ居ル所ガナイト云フ信念ヲ力説シタ。本官ハ假ニカカル不測ノ變ガ起キタトスレバ、確タル終局ノ勝利ノ見込ミモナイ、長期ノ高價ナ戰爭ニナラザルヲ得ナイコトヲ指摘シタ。本官ハ三ツノ明瞭ナ印象ヲ受ケテ「ワシントン」ヲ去ツタノデアル。即チ第一、艦隊ハ唯ダ外交上ノ主張ヲ支援シ旁々日本ノ侵略行動ヲ防碍スルタメニノミ「ハ

「ワイ」海域ニ留メラレテ居ツタコト。第二、日本ニ對シテ現實ニ戰端ヲ開ク意思ハ何等ナカツタコト。

第三、艦隊ノ當面ノ急務ハ訓練ノ促進ト新兵員ノ増強及ビ「ハワイ」海域ニ碇泊シテ居ルニ適合シタ最大限度ノ物的準備ヲ達成スルコトデアツタ。四、然ルニ一九四〇年十月、二度目ノ「ワシントン」訪問ノ際ハ全然異ツク印象ヲ受ケタ。事實コノ二回ノ訪問ノ間ニ國際情勢ハ實質的ニ變化シテ居タ。ソノ主ナ點ハ、英本土侵攻ノ危險ガ著シク緩和セラレ、爲ニ英國艦隊ガ損害ヲ蒙リ又ハ妥協スル如キ惧レガ少クナツタト云フコト。合衆國ハ大英帝國ト一層緊密ニ提携スル様ニナツテ居タコト。日本ノ進攻ハ印度支那ヲソノ支配下ニ置ク迄ニ進展シテ居リ更ニ和蘭領東印度ノ方面ニ進ム徵候ガ現ハレタコト。及公式ノ日獨伊同盟ハ傳ヘラレルトコロデハ合衆國ヲ目指スルモノデアツタコト。等デアル

原文二頁

五、斯ル變化ノ結果トシテ、現在ハ日本ヲ目指ス一層活潑デ明ラサ

マナ増置ガ眞剣ニ考慮セラレテ居リ、又若シ今斯カル措カル措置ガ採ラレルナラバ、積極的ナ戰闘行爲ガ始マル様ナ情勢ニアルト思ハレル。司令長官ガ本意見ヲ具申シナケレバナラナクナツタノハ、斯カル不測ノ事變ニ關連シテイルノデアル。

六、現下ノ國際情勢ニ鑑ミルトキハ、現在ノ*UPISF* *Y*及*UPISF* *S*計畫（オレンヂ）*Orange*ハ、合衆國艦隊ノ現勢力、合衆國海軍ノ現有資力ヲ超エルモノト信ゼラレル。コレハ以下ノ諸理由デ間違ヒノナイモノト信ゼラレル。

(1) 現在ノ合衆國艦隊ノ勢力ハ、實施シ得ベキ最初ノ機會ニ於テ、オレンヂ*Orange* 計畫ニ於ケルヨリ優勢ナル合衆國聯合アジア艦隊ヲ「マーシヤル、カロリン」*Marshall-Caroline* 水域ニ配置スルニ足リズ又更ニ西太平洋*Western Pacific* デ攻撃的作戰ヲナスタメ同地域ニ進攻シ得ル程度ニ準備スルニモ不足デアル。

吾々ハ實施シ得ベキ最初ノ機會ニ於テ云フ限定句ヲ認メハスルガ、英帝國ガ太西洋ノ吾國ノ利益ニ對シ責任ヲ執ツテ居ルトハ云ヘ、

現在ノ所吾々ハ、吾國ノ沿岸貿易ヲ保護シ南米ニ於ケル一層重要ナル
吾國ノ利益ヲ保全スルタメノ所要ノ勢力ヲ太西洋カラ移シ去ルコトハ
デキナイト確ク信ズル。更ニ吾々ハ吾々自身ノ貿易ノ保護ト、南大洋
Southern Pacificニ於ケル日本ノ貿易ヲ抑止スルコトヲ忌ムコトモ出來ナイ。
斯カル使命ニ十分ナ考慮ヲ拂フトキハ、吾ガ猶ル勢力ハ西方ヘノ行動
ノ當初ニ於テ既ニ殆ンド「オンシング」。計盤ミリ大デハナイ。

コレハ疑ヒモトク迄次ニ於テ消耗ヲ蒙ムルコトトナル。

(4) 陸軍ハ吾々ノ西攻ヲ支援スル準備ハ現在モナイシ、極ク近イ將來ニ
於テモナガロウ。艦隊ノ海兵兵力ノミヲ以テシテハ所要ノ作戦行動

ヲスメルニ不十分デアル。

(5) 第一基地ノ占領ハ、其ノ地域ノ詳細ナル知識ヲ必要トシ、其ノ知識
ヲ基礎ニ詳細ニ計畫セラレソシテ多數ノ商船ヲ入手シ、改裝シ、乗
組員ヲ配置訓練シ、又是等ヲ編成スルヲ要スル軍ノ重大作戦デアル。
占領後コノ基地ヲ建設スルニ必要ナコトハ、

(a) 大量ノ物資ノ輸送

(5) 所要ノ展開ヲ遂行シ得ル

原文三頁

施設部隊ノ編成、輸送及其ノ維持及(5)其ノ基地建設期間中ノ防禦、
補給デアル。同計畫ハ、資材ガ最初其ノ敷地ニ着イテカラ四十五日
後ニハコノ基地ガ完成スペキコトヲ要求シテ居ル。

辯護墨書類一五〇〇一九一

吾々ハ今ノ處是等多種多様ノ行動ヲ適切ニ計畫スルタメニ必要ナルソ
ノ地域ニ關スル詳細ナ知識ヲ有シテ居ラヌ。作戦ノ開始及攻撃ヲ行フタ
メノ一般的計畫ニハ充分ト思ハレル若干ノ知識ハ戰闘開始後偵察ニ依リ
得ラルベキコト及該計畫ガ斯カル作戦ニ對スル準備ナルコトハ間違ナキ
コトデアル。然シナガラ其ノ地域ノ水理ガ艦隊ノ碇泊ニ適スルヤ否ヤ、
問題ノ地區ノ陸上ニ如何ナル施設ヲナシ得ルヤ、又十分ナ防禦施設、特
ニ陸上機用飛行場ノ建設ガナシ得ルヤ否ヤハ現在ハ不明デアリ又實際ニ

占領スル迄ハ決定スルコトモ出來ナイ。

假令占據シタ根據地ガ是等施設ノ建設ヲ可能ナラシムルトシテモ、材料ノ集積、及建設ノタメノ編成ヲ行フコトハ確實ダト思ハレル。司令長官ノ知ル限りデハバ出來ナイト云フコトハ確實ダト思ハレル。司令長官ノ知ル限りリデハ此ノ目的ノタメニ從來何等ノ材料モ蒐集サレテ居ラズ、又此ノ目的ヲ徹底的ニ遂行スルタメニ漠然トシタ考ヘノ外如何ナル考案モ遙メラレテハ居ナイ。

現在ノ艦隊計畫ハ主トシテ基礎トナルベキ知識ガ不充分デアルタメト又追ハレテイルタメトニ依リ、其ノ内容ハ極ク一般ノ事ニ止マリ、且ツ主トシテ任務及部隊ノ割當ノ範圍ニ止マツテ居ル。此等ノ目的ノ實際ノ遂行ニ對シテハ、試験的考案ハ大部分ハ不適確ナ假令ニ基ケルモノノミガ進メラレテ來テ居ル。(a)現在ノ同計畫デハ時間トイフ要素ガ遂行スペキ任務ト非常ニ不釣合ニナツテ居ルト考ヘラレル。

實際ニハ一定ノ期限ト云フモノガ現ハサレテキナイノニ上述ノ四十五日トイフ期限ハ別トシテ第一ノ根據地ノ建設ニ至ルマデノ具体的ナ

作戦ガ動員後六十日乃至九十日位ノ期間中ニ完遂出来ルト云フコトガ
第十四ノ第二附録中ノ記表、及ビ〇一一計畫ソノモノ全体ヲ通ジテ強ク
示サレテ居ル。

タトヒ該計畫ノ第一目的（第一根據地）ニ向ツテ強力ナソレノミヲ目
的トスル手段ヲ直チニ取ツタトシテモ、其ノ完成ニハ六ヶ月乃至一ヶ年
位ヲ要スルダロウト云フノガ米國艦隊司令長官ノ堅ク信ズル所デアル。
現在ノ知識ヲ以テシテハ其後ノ作戦ニ幾何ノ時日ヲ要スルカハ豫想スラ
出來ナイ。其ノ作戦八月トイフヨリモ寧ロ年ヲ單位トシテ數ヘル期間ダ
ト信ゼラレル。(b)私ハ現在ノオレンヂ計畫(オレンヂ)ヲ眞ニ心カラ是認ス
ル將官ヲ知ラナイ。元來該計畫ノ發端ハ海軍施設擴張ニ影響ヲ及ボス如何ナ
ル國際情勢ニモ應ズル様ナ海軍施設擴張ニ對シ指導の方針ヲ與ヘテ置ク
コトガ望マシイト云フニアツタコトハ一般的概念デアル。

オレンヂ計畫(オレンヂ)ノ實行出來ヌ性質ノモノデアルコトヲ、是ニ勝
ル計畫ナキタメ豫算上ノ目的ト國會提出トノタメニ、海軍省ガ必要ナル
海軍擴張ヲ最大限度ニ正當化セントスル目的デシバラクノ間看過シテ來

タモノト私ハ信シテ居ル。私ノ考ヘデハ艦船建造ハ末ダ該計畫ヲ満足ニ遂行シ得ル程度迄モ進捗シ居ラザルモノト思フ。

七、オレンヂ計畫Orange Plan以外ニ司令長官ハ既ニ承認済ノ海軍基礎的作戰計畫即チ、レインボー第一號 Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 1 及末ダ承認サレザル陸海軍連合作戰計畫ニ關スル試案、即チ、レインボー第二 Joint Army & Navy Plan Rainbow No. 2ヲ有シテ居ル。

是等兩計畫中ニアル假定事項ハ何レモ現在ノ情勢ニ適合セザルノミナラズ、司令長官ノ知ル限りデハ、試案レインボー第二號ニ具体的ニ示サレテ居ル連合軍カラノ援助モ恐ラク不可能ト思フ。

八、上記考案ハ、司令長官ヲシテ信ズルニ至ラシメタル事柄ガ、適當ナ指示ナクシテハ、突然危險ナ狀態ニナルヤモ知レヌトイフコトヲ司令長官ガ認識シテイルトイフコトニ注意ヲ集中セシムル爲相當ニ長々ト陳述サレテイル。國策、國家ノ誓約、國家ノ目標ヲ明瞭ニ心中ニ描寫シナイ限り、司令長官ハ安全及ビ防禦ノ明瞭ナル手段並ニ將來ノ不測ノ事件ニ對スル早急ノ準備ニ對スルモノ以外ニハ自己ノ計畫ヲ明示

スルコトハ出來ナイ。彼ハ戰爭ニ於ル作戰ノ成攻ハ唯健全ナル計畫、周到ナル特定ノ準備ト成功疑ナシト確信スル方針ニ基キ勇敢ニ實行シテ行クコトニノミ懸ツテイルトイコトヲ堅ク信ジテキル。

九、司令長官ハ自己ノ正當ナ責任ヲ固避シヨウトスル意志或ハ希望ハ毛頭ナク又本書簡中ノ何物モ然ク解釋サレルコトモ望ンディナイ。如何ナル計畫モ凡ユル有リ得ベキ事態ヲ識知シ又ハソレニ對シ準備ヲナスコトハ出來ナイトイフコト、又實際起ツタ事態ニ適應スル様調整、再計等ヲ行ハナケレバナラヌトイフコトハ充分認識サレテイル。同時ニ司令長官ハ若シ自己ノ全任務ヲ實行スルノデアルナラバ海軍省ノ計畫ト意圖ニ關シ現在以上ニ良ク知ラシテモラハナケレバナラナイトイフコトヲ確ク信ズルモノデアル。

一〇、上記ノ事柄ヲ簡單ニ概説スレバ次ノ通りデアル。

(a) 海軍施設ノ現狀並ニ現在ノ進展ノ程度ニ於テハオレンデ○^{アラカル}ハ不適當ナルコト

(b) 合衆國艦隊司令長官ノ利用シ得ベキ他ノ案ハ適用シ得ザルモノナルコ

ト（第一、第二號虹案 Red Book Plan）

(c) (1) 現在知レル限リニ於テ或ハ豫言出來ル範囲ニ於テ現在ノ事實、國家

ノ目標ト誓約ヲ基トシタ新規指示（恐ラク第三號虹案）
（2）國策ヲ以テ現ハサレタ計畫ト國策遂行ニ取ラレル手段トノ整合ノ絶
對的必要

(d) 現在司令長官ノ入手シ得ル情報ヨリ見テ、長官ハ現實的計畫ノ要素ハ
次ノモノヲ當然包容スルコトヲ確信シテキル。

(1) 西半球ノ安全保障並防禦方法
(2) 長距離ニ亘ル敵通商ノ禁止

(3) 敵ニ對スル威嚇並ニ襲撃

(4) 海軍施設ノ比較戰力（同盟國、載力ト行動ノ自由ニヨリ影響アルヤ
モ知レズ）ガ作戰支持ノ爲ニ建設サレル場合ニ作戰ヲ擴大スルコト。
一一、至急電報ニテ本書簡受領ヲ承認アリタシ
一二、發信人ハ「祕」以外ノ區別ヲ許スガ如キ方法ヲ以テ本書ヲ名狀ス
ルコトヲ實行不能ト思料スルコトヲ茲ニ證明スル。

一三、本書配達ハ緊急ヲ要スルモノ故次回ノ將校特使ニ托シテハ受信人
ハ合衆國大陸内ニ於テ本書ノ書留郵便發送ヲ正當ト認メル。

ジエー、オー、リチャードスン

Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Lt. Gen. L. T. Gerow - Wednesday, December 5, 1945.

• • • • •
Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, do you remember that during the time you were in the War Plans Division there were certain conversations with the British with respect to a joint war plan in case the two nations were drawn into the war?

General GEROW. I do, sir.
Mr. MITCHELL. That is called the ABC, which means American-British Conversations, does it?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir; ABC-1.
(2609) Mr. MITCHELL. ABC-1?
General GEROW. And there was an ABC-2.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was also a British staff plan, was it, a joint plan with Britain?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.
Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember whether during that time there were conversations between military officers of the United States and Canada with respect to a joint operation with Canada in case we were drawn into the war?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; there were such conversations conducted.
Mr. MITCHELL. And do you remember also that there was a similar conference held at Singapore or some place in the Far East between officers of the Army and Navy of the United States and with the British and Dutch, which resulted in a plan or recommendations made by that conference out there?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; there was such a conference conducted.
Mr. MITCHELL. I show you a document here which is entitled, "American-Dutch-British conversations, Singapore, April 1941." You have seen that document, have you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have seen this document. It is a report of the conversations at Singapore, sir, between the Americans, Dutch, and British.

• • • • •

Page 991, Part 3 - "Pearl Harbor Attack"



辯護團書類館 一五〇〇號 一四

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會の議事録、合衆國、第七十九議會、第一九四五年十二月五日水曜日——陸軍中將エル・ティー・ジェローラ述書よりの抜萃。

ミッチエル氏 「ジェロー將軍、貴官は、戦争計畫部に在勤當時、英米兩國が戦争に捲込まれた場合の共同作戦計畫に關して、英國側と何か會談があつたか覚えてゐますか、?」

ジェロー將軍 「左様、ありました。」

ミッチエル氏 「それは所謂A・B・Oであつて、英米會談といふ意味ですか?」

ジェロー將軍 「その通りであります、A・B・O其の一であります。」

ミッチエル氏 「A・B・O其の一とは?」

ジェロー將軍 「そして、A・B・O其の二といふのがありました。」

ミッチエル氏 「其れも亦英國參謀の計畫で英國との共同計畫案でしたか?」

ジェロー將軍 「そうであります。」



ミッチャエル氏 「貴官は其の當時、我々が戦争に引き込まれた場合には合衆國の軍部将校と加奈陀との間に、加奈陀と共同作戦を行はふといふ事に關して會談が行はれたか、どうか御記憶ですか？」

ジエロー將軍 「記憶してあります、その様な會談が行はれました。」

ミッチャエル氏 「それから、貴官は、合衆國の陸、海軍將校と英國及びオランダ將校との間に、シンガポールか又は極東の或る土地に於て、同様な會議が開催され、其の會議の結果として、或る計畫又は推論へ勧告へが作られたといふことも覺えて居りますか？」

ジエロー將軍 「覚えて居ります。その様な會議が行はれました。」

ミッチャエル氏 「ヘアメリカ、オランダ、イギリス會議。一九四一年四月、シンガボール」と題する書類を、私はここで貴官に御目にかけます。貴官は其の書類を御覽になつたことがありますね？」

ジエロー將軍 「そうです、私は此の書類を見たことがあります。それは、シンガボールに於けるアメリカ、オランダ及び英國間の會談の報告書であります。」

Excerpt from Exhibit 16 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

NOVEMBER 3, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

• • • • •

- e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.
- f. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied needs of Russia and Great Britain.
- g. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.

• • • • •

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

• • • • •

合衆國第七十九議會の第一會

眞珠灣攻撃共同查問會

證據書銀第一六號の拔萃

昭和十六年十一月三日

參謀長に對する覺書

主題 檜東島情の件

(e)

シンガポール及び廟印の防衛と共に中國に對する最も效果的な援助は
今日フイリツビンへの増兵によつて乗かれつゝある。空軍及び海航
艦の基地としてのルソン島の安全は陸軍及び地上部隊の援兵到着によ
つて近々相當確保されなければならぬ。至急に昭和十六年十二月中
頃即ちフイリツビン空軍が日本軍の作戦に對し絕對的脅威となる頃軍
事上の立場から強力なる外交及び經濟的駁迫が加へられるかも知れな
い。出來るなら強硬なる外交的及經濟的駁迫は昭和十七年の二月か
三月まで延ばす事が有利である。

その二月三月頃はフィリピンの空軍力が計画された如に達して居り更にサモア経由の安全航路が開通して居るのであらう。

(e) 中國に對する資材援助はロシア及び美國の必需物調査と相俟つて進められなければならぬ。

(g) 中國に於ける空軍義勇隊に對する援助は之を實行出来るだけ繼續し又促進しなければならぬ。

陸軍代將

參謀次長代理

エル、テー、ジエロー

眞珠灣攻撃

第十四部

ハ一〇六六頁ハ一〇六七頁

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
(with enclosures) - 12 November 1940.

(1) Secret

12 NOVEMBER 1940.

DEAR J. O.: You may think I have been unusually silent for the last couple of weeks, - and so I have. Truth of the matter is that a great part of this time was spent in making up an estimate of the international situation, together with a number of officers in Naval Operations and two from the General Board. As a start on this I sat down one early morning and drew up a twelve page rough estimate, working on up till two o'clock the next morning, this in the effort to clear my own mind, as I sometimes do by drawing up a paper. After I finished the rough notes, I then got together Ingersoll, Turner, Savvy, Charlie Wellborn, Forrest Sherman, Hill, Sexton, Moore and Oscar Badger and we went to it, day and night, Saturdays and Sundays, for about ten consecutive days. The product which no one claims is perfect is now in the hands of the President. I am hoping he will give some definite pronouncement on it in order that I may send you something more authoritative than I otherwise could do.

You know that we have no definite commitments. Perhaps none can be made. The direction which things finally take may be forced upon us.

For example, as you stated in a recent letter: - Upon your first visit here you found us of the opinion that in the event of war, we should not become involved in the Pacific and that any major effort, we might make would be in what we considered the most vital theater, namely, in the Atlantic. I have never changed my viewpoint on that and I may say that so far as I know, neither has the State Department. I believe the Secretary of the Navy also holds this view. But no appeasement.

Nevertheless, we can not afford to neglect the possibility of hostilities in the Pacific and that is why in so many of my letters I always mention keeping a weather eye to the Westward.

I think the study which was made when you were here, has been highly beneficial; studies of this sort always are, whether or not they are implemented.

I had hoped before this to get you the Navy end of RAINBOW III as a more thoroughly considered directive to meet the possibilities of the present situation in the Pacific. This RAINBOW III plan is nearing completion now and I expect to send it to you in a few days. I trust that you will find the tasks assigned to you are (2) within your power. We will await your comment.

We are pushing District preparation and degaussing work with all the speed we can command and if by any chance I could have until 1 April on this I would give a good deal. One January should see degaussing well along; one April much essential work accomplished in the Districts. Please do not construe that statement to mean that we might get into the war tomorrow, as I have nothing but my own thoughts on this. Nevertheless, you know I have felt right along that it is only a matter of time before we do get in (though I can not say this out loud). The chief question that concerns us is where we get in, and whom we will fight - and

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson (with enclosures) - 12 November 1940.

"tomorrow" or perhaps "today" is what I am working towards.

You have received the despatch directing the sending of submarines to Manila. There are no plans at present to send anything more in that direction. But present conditions are far from static, the Japanese appear to be making preparation for a definite move of some kind, and the answer we will give, if any, to the steps they may take in the future can not be predicted at this time.

Your letter regarding the retention of a part of the Fleet on the Coast beyond the date of its intended departure, and also holding another part in Hawaii, arrived at a time when the election prevented my presenting this question promptly to the President. Since the scheduled departure of the units from Hawaii was the day following my receipt of your letter, there was nothing for me to do other than to radio you to carry out the approved schedule. As you know, the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate, and could hardly be accomplished without a certain amount of preparation in Washington. It does not now appear that we can withdraw it without some good pretext.

Regarding this Winter's exercises there is no question as to the desirability of training both the Fleet and the troops in expeditionary operations which will simulate war as closely as possible. Therefore, I believe we should go ahead with the essential features of such a plan. As I understand the plan, you propose to assemble in Pearl Harbor an Expeditionary Force comprising most of the Fleet, plus transports in which are combat-loaded the west contingent of the Fleet Marine Force, plus tankers and supply ships. This expeditionary Force will then set out from Hawaii and will simulate the actual capture of an island, using Christmas Island or some other, perhaps San Clements for example - I have not received a copy of exactly what you plan to do and therefore this conception may be at fault.

We have all been greatly pleased over Churchill's statement of recent British action against the Italian Fleet. Also we are more than pleased over the success of the Greeks, - even though it may prove in the end to be temporary. We have nothing more official to date on this than newspaper reports.

(3) Regarding the German claim that they had sunk every ship in the 39-ship convoy in approximately longitude 32, latitude 58: - all but 6 of these ships have safely reached port.

Am expecting King to relieve Ellis shortly after the middle of December.

Hope the enclosed to Tommy Hart and Ghormley will be of some interest to you.

Best wishes as always.

Sincerely,

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico" c/o Postmaster,
Long Beach, California.

/s/ BETTY. JUL 7 1947



一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十一月十二日附エツチ。アール。スターク海軍
大將よりジエー。オー。リチャードソン海軍大將宛書簡（封入物共）

（一）「秘密」

拜啓。此の二週間すつかり御無沙汰したのは珍らしいと君も思ふだらう
が、その通りだ。實は此頃海軍作戦部の將校若干と總務委員二人と共に
國際情勢の目算を立てるのに殆ど暇がなかつた。先づ最初に朝早くから
仕事にかかり、翌朝の二時迄働いて十二頁許りの概算表を作つて見守り
之は時々論文を書いたりするのと同じに自分自身の精神を澄まさうと發
力してやつたことだ。この大体の覺書を作つてから、インガソル、ターナー、サヴィ、チャーリー、ウエルボーン、フォレスター、シャーマン、
ヒル、セクストン、ムーアとオスカー・バッジヤーとを集めそれから晝
夜を問はず土曜日曜も連續約十日間といふもの仕事をかかりつたのだ。そ
の成果は完全とはいへないまでも今大統領の手許迄出してある。他の何
によるよりも君にもつと確かな事を知らせられるやうに大統領がそれに
就てはつきりした聲明をしてくれるやう望んでゐる。
知つての通り我々は何等明確な公約を持たない。恐らく出來ないのだ。

結局事物の赴く方向が我々の上に強ひられるのだ。

例へば最近の便りで君が述べてゐるやうに――君が始めて當地を訪れた時の我々の意見は、戦争の際我々としては太平洋の問題に巻き込まれてはならない。我々がなすであらう主たる勢力は我々が最も重要な活動の舞台と考へるところ即ち太平洋に於けるあらうといふにあつた。之について私の見解は少しも變らないし、又私の知る限りに於て國務省も又然りであるといへよう。海軍長官も又此の見解を擇してあると信ずる。しかも少しも緩和しないで。しかしながら我々は太平洋に於ける戦争勃發の可能性を等閑視する余裕はない。だからこそ之迄の手紙でも度々、西方に氣を配れと私は何時も云つてゐるのだ。

君が當地にゐられた頃勉強されたことは大變役に立つたと思ふ。此の種の勉強はそれが成就されると否とに拘らず常に有益なものだ。

太平洋の現状のあらゆる可能性に對処するため一層徹底して考へられた指令として君にレインボー第三次計画も今や完成に近く二三日中に君の許に届けられるつもりだ。君に托される此の任務は十分君のなし得るものであると信する。君の批判に俟つ。

(二) 我々は今全速力で管區準備と非磁化作業を推進してゐるが、之については四月一日迄にもし機會があれば詳しく述いて知らせよう。一月には非磁化作業も進捗してゐる筈だし四月には極めて肝要な事業が各管區で完成せられるであらう。

この言葉を我々が明日にも戦争を始めるかのやうに取らないでいたゞきたい、之については私一個の考にすぎないのだから。それにも拘らず、我々が戦争を始めるのは一之は大きな點ではないが一單に時間の問題にすぎないといふことにについては私が常に正しく感じてゐたことは君も知つてゐる。我々に關係のある主要な問題は何處で戦争に入り誰と戦ふかといふ點であり、明日か、事によつたら今日にも、といふのか我々の目指す所なのだ。

君は潜水艦をマニラに派遣せよとの急便を受取つたといふが、今のところその方面にどのやうなものにしろ増派するといふ計画は全くない。しかし現状は決して静止してゐるのではない。日本軍は或る種の明確な行動のための準備を行つてゐるらしい。彼等が將來執らんとする處置に對し我々が與ふであらう回答は現在之を豫言することは出来ない。

艦隊の一部を出航豫定日を超えて太平洋沿岸に留め又他の一部をハワイに置くといふ君の手紙が到着した時は丁度選舉のため此の問題を直に大統領の許に提出することが出来なかつた。艦隊のハワイ出航豫定は君の手紙を受取つた翌日に當つてゐたので君に承認された計画を實行するやうに打電するより外に仕方がなかつたのだ。君も知る如く艦隊をハワイから撤收するといふことはテリケートな問題でワシントンに於ける或程度の準備なしには遂行され難い。今のところ何かよい口實がなければ撤收は出來ないやうに思はれる。

今冬の訓練に就ては艦隊及び陸上部隊を出来るだけ實戦に近い特別演習で訓練するのが望ましいことは勿論である。だから私はかかる計画の本質的特徴を更に押し進めなければならぬないと信ずる。私がその計画を了解する限りでは君は艦隊の大部分、に加へて西方派遣海兵隊を滿載した輸送船、及び油槽船、補給船よりなる遠征部隊の眞珠灣集結を提案してゐる。遠征部隊はそれからハワイを出發し、クリスマス島その他――悉く例へばサン・クレメント――を利用して實地に島嶼、占領演習を行ふだらう。未だ正確な君の計画の爲しを受け取つてゐないから、この

考へは間違つてゐるかもしだれない。

イタリヤ艦隊に對する英國最近の處置についてのチャーチルの演説には我々は皆非常に満足してゐる。ギリシャの成功についても――たとひ結局は一時的なものとなるにしても――我々は十二分に満足してゐる之については新聞の報道以上の公報は何もない。

(三) 独逸側が三十九隻の被収送船をすべて大凡緯度三十二、緯度五十八の地點で沈没したといふ主張については――その中六隻以外は全部無事港に着いてゐる。

國王は十二月十九直後にエリスの仕を解かれるものと思ふ。
同封のトミ：・ハート及びゴーミリー宛の手紙は君にも若干興味があると思ふ。
では御機嫌よう。

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十一月十二日

ペ
テ
イ

カリフォルニヤ州、ロング・ビーチ郵便局長氣付
「ニュー・メキシコ」號乗組、米國艦隊司令長官
海軍大將ジェー・オー・リチャードソン
啟

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(10) 27 November 1941 from G-2 to G-2 Hawaii. Subject: G-2 Warning.

(10) Secret

P 2 War WD Ptry

Washington, D. C., November 27, 1941.

G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
E. Shafter, T. H.
473-27TH

~~Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop~~
~~Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be~~
~~expected Stop Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff~~
only.

MILES

144PM

(Page 1929 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



合衆國議會第七九議會第一期

眞珠灣攻撃聯合調查委員會證據書類第三二號拔萃

證據書類第三二號

一九四一年自七月八日至九月七日陸軍在ハワイ間往復文書

(十) 一九四一年十一月二七日 G-12發ハワイ G-12 完

件名 G-12 警告事項

(十一) 稟

p-12 war wa party

ワシントン 一九四一年十一月二七日

G-12 ハワイ 廉 ハワイ、シャフタ 1 要害

四七三一七日

擲日交渉ハ事變上兩艦セリ(トメ)敵對行爲開始セラルベシ(トメ)
破壊的行動初期セラル(トメ)司令長官及參謀長ニノミ知ラセヨ
マイルズ

「眞珠灣攻撃」第十四卷一三二九頁

Def. Doc. # 1500-R-2



KJ
Defense Doc. 1500-R-3

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(23) 23 October 1941 to OPNAV, Action: COM12, 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF.

(23) Top secret

23 OCTOBER 1941.

From: OPNAV

Action: COM 12 COM 14 CINCPAC CINCAF COM 16.

Info: COM 11 COM 13 COM 15 NAVSTA GUAM.

222250

(Paraphrase)

Until further orders all army and navy transpacific troop transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military cargo will be escorted both ways between Honolulu and Manila. Authorized route slow vessels in above categories which would unduly prolong voyage via Torres Straits without escort. To insure minimum demands for escort from Pacific fleet schedules must be arranged so that these ships proceed in company. CINCAF should take over escort when and where practicable as arranged between CINCPAC and CINCAF. General escorting other transpacific American flag shipping not considered warranted at this time in view of routing prescribed in my 162258. Where cargo in merchant bottoms for Guam is involved normal routing is authorized.

Cargo for Guam should be so assembled and loaded that a minimum number of ships be required to make that port. Reference COM 12 despatches to CINCPAC Nos. 212352 and 212358 and CINCAF confidential serial 01633.

(Page 1403, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



米國第七十九議會第一期ニ於ケル眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會ノ書證第三
七號 括 準

書 證 第三七號

電報ノ基本的書證

二

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月二十三日海軍作戰部宛

作戰關係 一 太平洋艦隊司令官、第一二、第一四、第一六司令官、聯合軍總司令官

機 寶 一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月二十三日

海軍作戰部ヨリ

作戰關係 一 太平洋艦隊司令長官第一二、第一四司令官、聯合軍

總司令官、第一六司令官

情 報 一 ダアム海軍要港

一一、第一

二二二二五號



(意)

(譯)

追テ指令スル迄陸海軍ノ太平洋輸送船、彈薬輸送船其ノ他多量ノ重要軍需貨物搭載船ハホノルル及マニラ間往復共護衛セラルベシ。認可航路ハ上記ノ船舶ノ航行ヲ遲延シ護衛ナキ「トーレス」海峡經由ノ航行ヲ余分ニ延長スルモノナリ太平洋艦隊ノ護衛要求ヲ最少限度ニ止ムル爲之等船舶ハ船團ヲ組ム様豫定表ヲ編成スルヲ要ス。太平洋艦隊司令官トノ間ノ協議ニ從ヒ聯合軍總司令官ハ太平洋艦隊司令官トノ間シタルモノト看做サズ。「ダアム」行貨物ハ同港ニ入港スル船舶ヲ成ルベク少ナカラシムル爲之ヲ集積シ積荷スルヲ要ス。太平洋艦隊司令長官宛第一二司令官電報第一二三五二號及第二一二三五八號並聯合軍總司令官連續板秘番號第一六三三號ヲ照スベシ。

Proceedings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session.

Excerpt from testimony of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner - Thursday, December 20, 1945.

.....

Admiral TURNER. I think, in answer to that question, the committee might be interested in a brief resume of all of (5118) the conferences that were held between the American authorities and the British and the Dutch.

The first contact with the British in Singapore was made by our naval attaché, Commander Thomas, who was going to Thailand in October, about the 23d.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What year?

Admiral TURNER. October of 1940. That was merely exploratory. On November 11, in response to a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, Captain Furnell, the chief of staff of Admiral Hart, went to Singapore and had exploratory conversations with them, with instructions that no commitments were to be made. There were no written documents issued from those two preliminary conferences.

The next conference that was held--and it was in compliance with the letter which has just been read--was from January 14 to January 16, 1941, at Batavia, between the Commander in Chief of the Dutch Forces and Captain Purnell. We have in this paper a dispatch summary of the result of those conversations, and I have in my possession the minutes of that meeting, which I believe the counsel has not seen, which I just very recently got. It adds nothing particularly.

Then we received word that finally the British and Dutch were going to get together in Singapore in the latter part of (5119) February of 1941. Captain Purnell attended this British-Dutch conference and was authorized to agree to tentative methods of command, tentative methods and areas of operations, either jointly or separately, and to exchange of communication facilities and intelligence, but of course under the instructions that there would be no political or definite military commitments.

Nothing very definite came out of that conference.

The next conference--and on which there is another letter directing that this conference be held, and a letter or a dispatch from the British Chiefs of Staff concerning the conference--was held in Singapore about the 19th of April, 1941. Out of that conference was evolved the ADB paper which is here, and which the counsel has just produced.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is exhibit 50.

Admiral TURNER. That paper contained a lot of objectionable features, and the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff in the Army, on July 3, 1941, in a letter to the British Joint Staff Mission here, rejected that paper in toto and requested that additional instructions be issued, so that we could get another agreement.

In brief, the objections were two: First, there were some political implications in the paper which were not acceptable to us, and one of them was this deadline down in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The other objection (5119) was that the plan was not very realistic and did not seem to advance in many respects the possible cooperative effort between the different countries.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me for interrupting you, but that document that the Admiral just referred to, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the British rejecting this Singapore proposal has already been introduced in evidence as exhibit 65.

Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral TURNER. As a result of that rejection, and after considerable conversations between our representatives and the British representatives here in Washington, the British Chiefs of Staff produced a paper which was a proposal for a draft of an agreement, and which had the title "ADB-2." The date of that is August, 1941. That paper was not entirely acceptable but was closer to our ideas.

Negotiations on the basis of that draft agreement were proceeding rather slowly, until the arrival of Admiral Phillips, the new British Far Eastern Commander in Singapore, in November. Admiral Phillips and some staff officers went to Manila and had conferences there with our authorities, chiefly Admiral Hart, and Admiral Hart on the 6th of December, his date, which would have been the 5th here, sent a dispatch to us concerning arrangements which he had made with Admiral (5121) Phillips as to command, and so on, in the war which then was coming, within a day or two.

That agreement, with some slight modifications and remarks, was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, it being only a naval agreement, on the 7th of December, and the dispatch went out on the 8th.

(5122) In none of these papers was there ever a political commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of action, or these were plans of action based on assumptions that should the United States enter the war, then these papers would be effective, provided they were approved by the proper authorities.

None of ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of War, or to the President, although all of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that these conversations were being held from time to time.

(Pages 1931 - 1933, Part 4 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

Proceedings of Navy Court of Inquiry incorporated in evidence presented before the Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral Stark

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the antiaircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 80.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today: The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 12 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, B-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila. A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes. A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched. A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

G.C.M.,
Chief of Staff.

I gave original to Mr. Stimson.

(Hand written:) (You may have had word of this already!)

Part 33, "Pearl Harbor Attack" - Pages 1233-1234.

- 1 -



辯護側書類一五〇〇-R-五號

合衆國第七十九國會第一會期、眞珠灣
攻撃調査委員會ニ提出ノ證據書類中ニ包含セラレタル海軍查問
會議記錄

一九四一年九月十二日スターク提督ヘノ覺書

B E T T Y 君一貴下ハ我々ガ比島ニ對シ如何ナル行動ヲ執リツツアル
カフ尋ネラレタ。

八月二十六日一「サンフランシスコ」ヘ高射砲隊聯隊ノ一部ト豫備部
隊若干ガ航シタ。

九月八日一「サンフランシスコ」カラ該高射砲聯隊ノ殘部、五〇台ヨ
リ成ル戰車大隊、最新型追擊機五十機及ビ其ノ搭乗員ガ出航シタ。此ノ
結果比島ニ於ケル新型追擊機ハ八十台ニ達シタ。

九月十八日一七十五台ノ大砲用ノ自力推進機附キ砲架五十台ト、更ニ
五十台ノ戰車ガ積出サレル豫定

本日一空ノ要塞九機編隊ガ「ミドウェイ」「ウェイキ」「ニューブリテン」



蘭領東印度航路ヲ無事ニ飛行シ「ニラ」ニ着陸シタ。

九月三十日一空ノ要塞ニ中隊（二十六機）「サンフランシスコ」ヨリ
「ハワイ」經由比島ヘ出航スル豫定。

十月一十月ニハ十二機、十二月迄ニハ百三十機ニ達スル豫備ガ追撃機
着々積ミ出サレル手筈。

十一月一多分六機乃至九機ノ超空ノ要塞、B-1二十四型機ガ「マニ
ラ」ニ移動サレル豫定。コレ等ノ航空機ハ一萬四千頓ノ爆弾ヲ積載シテ
千五百哩ノ行動半經ガ可能デアル。即チ大阪ニハコノ全積載力ヲ以テ東
京ニハコノ一部ノ積載力ヲ以テ到達ヲ可能トスル。又高壓室ヲ備ヘ、爆
撃ノ爲絶エズ三萬五千呎ノ高度ヲ保ツ事ガ可能。

十二月一約三十五機ヨリ成ル新タナル空ノ要塞一編隊「マニラ」ニ向
フ。約五十四機ヨリ成ル急降下爆撃機一編隊モ又同地ニ向フ。約百三十
機ヨリ成ル追撃機一編隊ガ先行ノ追撃機隊補充ノ爲ノ追加二中隊ト共ニ
派遣サレル豫定。以上スペテノ航空機ニ對シ五十バーセントノ豫備ヲ設
置中。

参謀長

ジー、シー、マーシャル

予ハ原文ヲステイムソソニ與ヘタ。
(ベン書キ) (以上ノ事ニツキ貴下ハ既ニ報告ヲ受ケテ居ルヤモ知レナ
イ)

「真珠灣攻撃」第三十三部一自一二三三頁至一二三四頁。

(1) Secret

12 NOVEMBER 1940.

DEAR TOMMY: We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet know the direction which affairs may take.

For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours, together with a group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may be adopted with respect to the war.

Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days after the reelection of the President - which is merely another evidence of their slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between themselves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then again, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at Singapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Singapore, were attacked.

The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore (2) the fields of:

Command arrangements,
General objectives,
General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon. But with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well fall short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight Japan.

I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.

D. D. 1500-S-1



But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

- (a) Occupy Guam, and reenforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;
- (b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and air forces, basing her main fleet in the Pescadores and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;
- (c) Capture Iaon with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;
- (d) Capture Borneo, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval re-enforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reenforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

You may will appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).

The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping to send naval attaché's to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon; possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.

We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must have been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.

You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. Navy,

Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

P.S. All sixty today. Here's hoping! The first three score are the hardest!

18 NOVEMBER 1940.

ADMIRAL HART:

P.S. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's hoping.

(一)

秘
親愛なるトミイ

辯護文書

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十一月十二日



我々は萬一の事態に備へて物的・人的準備を出来るだけ速かに進めてい
ます。未だ爲すべき仕事は澤山ありますが、かかる状態は數年續くで
せう。私が統轄する仕事に關する限り情況は思はしくないとは言えま
せん。併し事態がどういう方向に向ふか未だ我々には分りません。

過くる三週間、私は特別に關係のある一團の將校達と將來起り得べき
海軍の戰爭作戦に影響を與える物的・状況の大体の見積を下すのに多く
の時間を費して來ました。この見積又は研究は今や大統領の御手許に
あります。私は急速の決定を豫期してはいませんが、それが事情を明
かにするのに役立つて少くとも當局者の方々が戰争に關して採らるべき
特別政策の眞意を充分に承知されることを切に希望します。

英國人は大統領再選後數日にして我々が戰争に參加すると思つたとゴ

レムリイは私に告げていますが、これは英國人のいゝ加減の考へ方、國際的政治情勢並びに我が米國の政治制度に對する彼等の非現實的見解を示すもう一つの證據にすぎません。彼等は歐洲に於ける影響を大して考慮しないで、英國と米國と和蘭との間の同盟によつてマレー障壁を防備することについて大まかに話し合つて來ました。併し若し和蘭だけが、もしくは我々だけが日本人によつて攻撃された場合英國は直ちに戰斗を開始するかどうかは疑問です。

それから又トマスがシンガポールで手に入れた英國極東戰爭計畫の寫しは彼等の例の希望的考えを示す大きな證據です。更に和蘭植民地當局はその植民地を掠奪せんとする企てには反抗するものと私は信じていますが、若しフライリツピンがシンガポールだけが攻撃された場合彼等が戰うかどうか私には疑問です。

海軍は勿論政治的言質を與えることは出來ません。故に我々は連合戰爭に對する特別の軍事計畫を樹てることは出來ません。併し私が公文書で貴方に申し上げたように、萬一我々が戰争を強いられた場合、英

(二)

國は出来ることなら和蘭と將來の共同計畫の骨組をこしらえておくことは貴方のお役に立つでせう。併し和蘭が貴方と忌憚なく話すかどうかは疑はしい次第です。若し彼等が話すとすれば私の考では貴方は

大凡の陸海軍の展開を含めて共同活動の指揮協定、一般目的一般計畫の分野を研討されることと思います。

貴方は勿論ルソンを防備するのに陸軍を援助する命令を與へられていました。併し連合基地に頼るとしても陸軍に對する貴方の直接の支援は、我々だけが日本と戦う場合に貴方が與へ得る援助としては幾分足りないのは當然です。

私は日本は避けられるなら我々を攻撃するとは思いません。事實日本は合衆國との戦争を避けるためには十分つくすものと私は信じます。日本が今英國や和蘭と戦うことを望んでいるかどうかは疑わしい位です。日本は準備として一立場を維持しながら印度支那を更に北方にある日本の立場と緊密にして之を固め、和蘭領東印度及シヤムに多少とも漸進的な經濟的侵出を始める方を選ぶ可能性が多いように思はれます。我々が

經濟的制裁をこれ以上加えるのを控えれば、最近の百八十万噸の石油契約を含めての現在の状態は可成長い將來に亘つて安定するかも知れません。貴方も御承知かと思ひますが我が國務省はこの契約の實行に拘はつたのであります。

併しどうなるか分りません。日本と英、蘭、米の同盟との間に戦争が始まつたら、私の考では日本は次の計畫を樹てるでせう。

(a) グアムを占領して、委任統治領を軍隊、潜水艦及若干の空軍を以て強化すること。

(b) 日本艦隊主力の根據地をベソアドレスにおき、強力にして速度の早い分遣隊をヘルマヘラにおいて、我が海空軍を擊破してフイリツビン近海の制海權を獲得すること。

(c) (d) 現在台灣及海南島に駐屯している軍隊を以てルソンを奪取することと。

連合國の目的は經濟的飢餓によつて日本の攻勢力を低下させるにある

と私は信じます。この封鎖の成否は一つに連合國がマレー障壁の重要な部分を維持することが出来るか否かにかゝっています。勿論貴方御自身の行動は窮屈の目的達成に役立つ最も效果的な方法に關する貴方の御考に基いてなされるでしよう。

貴方が信頼出来る一つのことは一これは貴方のお耳にだけ入れますが一我多分スラバヤかシンガポールに海軍の援隊を送ることと他の方法で私は貴方を支持することです。私はかかる援隊の大きさや編成に關する貴方の御考をお聞きしたいと思います。併し貴方の勧告をなさるに際して我々は他の二つの権軸國との戦争に参加するかも知れないことから我が海軍は中部太平洋に留らねばならぬことと英國の崩壊によつて我々は再び太西洋に大に注意を向けねばならないことを念頭においておられることが私は信じます。

私がかかる戦争一英國の崩壊一を望んでいないことを貴方に分つて頂けると思います。

此の起り得べき戦争に對する戦争計畫の海軍の部分即ち虹三部は殆ん

Dof. Doc. #1500-S-1

ど完成して近い中に貴方の御手許に届くでせう。

我々は海軍武官をシンガポール、バタビヤ、スマバヤ、バリクババンセイロンに派遣する積りです。恐らくこの中の一人が空中輸送によつてこの計畫を貴方にお届けするかも知れません。

我々は皆厄介者を貴方にお任せ出来ることを喜んでいます。國務省は我々を強く支持してくれました。我々が厄介者を強制的に本国に戻しているのに、陸軍は厄介者を送り出しているのが分つた時に貴方が憤慨された氣持はよく分ります。

私は私に出来ることなら大提督のみならずどんな小提督をも援助する機會が来ればこれを常にどんなに喜んでいるか貴方にはお分りのことと 思います。

お元氣で

親愛なるベテイより（署名）

合衆國海軍合衆國アジア艦隊司令長官

海軍大將 T. O. H. E. T.

追伸

今日で六十歳です。こゝに希望があります。
最初の六十これが一番苦しいでしよう。

一九四〇年十一月十八日

海軍大將ハート

追伸

新しい逐艦に關して大統領の御手許に届ける名簿に海軍大將プラウン
ソンの名を記載して決裁を仰く次第です。
こゝに希望があります。

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32

MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII
FROM JULY 8 to SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(11) 28 November 1941 from MacArthur to Marshall. Subject:
Reply to Marshall warning.

(11)

NOVEMBER 28, 1941.
453AM

From: Manila, P.I.
To: General George C. Marshall
No. 1004, November Twenty-eighth.

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two
four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in
conjunction with the Navy stop Ground security measures have
been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by present
state of development of this theatre of operations everything
is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop
Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist
between Army and Navy.

MACARTHUR

Secret

(Page 1329 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")



轉譯印證第一五〇〇一三一2號

第七十九回米國議會、第一回眞珠灣攻撃案本共同委員會の證言
第三十二號拔萃

證據書類第三十二號

一九四一年七月八日より九月七日までの陸軍省及ハワイ間の通信、
(十一)一九四一年十一月二十八日、マッカーサー發、マーシャル宛
〔目〕マーシャル警告に対する回答

(十一)一九四一年十一月二十八日午前四時五十三分

比島、ミニラ

ジョージ。C。マーシャル大將宛

第一〇〇四號十一月二十八日

貴下の無電第六二四號による訓令に共き、航空偵察隊は海軍と連絡して機器、強化された。地上に於ける安全保障對策は既に講ぜられた。當作り地域の現在の發展情勢の許す範圍内に於て、防衛完遂の準備は



萬端整つた。陸、海の間には緊密な、連絡及協同、並に根篤な關係
が存在してゐる。

私

マツカーサー

(『眞珠湾攻撃』第十四卷第一三二九頁)

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 5 of the Proceedings of the Clarke Investigation introduced in Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

(Exact copy - action copy - radiogram)

AG 380.3 (6-25-41) MC

21 WTJ

AE

620P

Received at the War Department, June 26, 1941, 8:00 AM.

From: Manila

To: TAG

No. 1225, June 25th.

Following is paraphrase of cable from Brink. For G-2. On 19th and 20th of June British Commander in Chief Far East and the Director of Operations of Chinese Air Force (General Mow) discussed plans for cooperation in the event of Japanese operations against the British. British plan to use following Chinese airfields as bases from which to attack Japanese sea communications, land troops, and Japanese bases on Hainan Island and in French Indo China in the event of Japanese attack against Malaya or Hongkong; Nanning 23 degrees zero minutes north 108 degrees 30 minutes east: Liuchow 24 degrees 20 minutes north 109 degrees 20 minutes east: Kweilin 25 degrees 20 minutes north 110 degrees 10 minutes east: Chihkiang 27 degrees 30 minutes north 109 degrees 40 minutes east: Hemagyang 27 degrees zero minutes north 112 degrees 30 minutes east. Chinese agree to stock these airfields now with gasoline and bombs. Chinese suggest that the British use airfields in the following area from which to make direct raids on Formosa and the Japanese mainland: Wenchow-Chuchowfu-Kienowhs.

British intend to encourage Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the following general areas: Ichang-Kingchow-Hanhu; Siagtanh Changsha-Yowchow; Nanchang-Haohcow-Kiukiang; Soochow-Changshow-Taiping; Canton-Kongmoon-China Sea-Shamchung. Agreements for mutual cooperation will be arranged the 1st week in July at a meeting between British and Chinese staffs in Burma. Signed Orear.

GRUNERT.

(Page 166, Part 34 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

機護側文書一五〇〇一八一五

眞珠灣攻撃調査共同委員會提出「クラーク」調査報告
證據書類第五號拔萃一合衆國第七十九議會、第一期

正寫一行動寫一無電

A G 三八〇〇三 (六一ニ五一四一) N O

二一四四四

A 日

六二〇 P

一九四一年六月二十六日午前八時陸軍省着

マニラ發、T A G 第一二二五號 六月二十五日

下記ハ「ブリンク」ヨリノ G-13 密電報意譯ナリ。六月十九日、二十
日、英國極東司令長官ト支那駐軍長官(毛將軍)ハ日本ガ英國ニ對シ
作戦ヲ起ス場合ノ協力ニ就キ討議セリ。日本ガ香港、馬來攻撃ノ際ハ
英國ハ下記支那空軍基地ヨリ日本ノ海上連絡、陸上軍、海南島及佛印
ニ於ケル日本基地ヲ攻撃スル計画中ナリ。